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When One Is Not Enough, But Two Is a
Company Union: A First Amendment
Analysis of the National Labor Relations
Board's Restrictions on Employee
Involvement at the Nonunion Workplace
by MARK J. MAHONEY*
Introduction
Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) of the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act (commonly referred to as the "Wagner Act" in recognition of its
principal congressional sponsor, Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY)),
have played a central role in American labor relations since they first
entered into law.' Drafted with the aim of eliminating employer-
* B.A. Philosophy, 1980, University of Chicago; M.A. Philosophy, 1983, University
of Chicago; J.D., cum laude, 1986, Boston College Law School. The author represents
employers in labor and employment law matters.
1. Section 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006), provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer
to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by
the Board..., an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting
employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of
time or pay ....
This section appeared as Section 8(2) in the Wagner Act. See Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 8(2),
49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006)). The Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (the "Taft-
Hartley Act") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2006)), changed the section
number of this provision to Section 8(a)(2), but left its substance unaltered. For
simplicity's sake, I refer to this section as Section 8(a)(2) even when discussing its
historical appearance within the 1935 law. Section 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006), defines
a "labor organization" as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
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sponsored employee representation committees (so-called "company
unions"), which had begun to challenge trade unions2 for hegemony
in the field of employee representation in the years prior to the
Wagner Act, these sections removed what was thought to be a major
impediment to trade union organization and industrial peace.'
However, developments in the theory of human resource
management and the concomitant proliferation of nonunion
employee involvement programs during the past thirty-five years has
led to much commentary on the wisdom of a statutory scheme that
often acts as an obstacle to employers' efforts to improve
productivity, enrich employees' working experience, and provide
employees a greater role in workplace decision-making.4
For a long time, missing from this commentary was any serious
consideration as to whether Section 8(a)(2), in tandem with Section
2(5), violates the First Amendment. The lack of attention to this
issue was perhaps understandable given that the Supreme Court
rejected a First Amendment challenge to Section 8(a)(2) in its 1959
decision in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.' However, subsequent
developments in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence call the
Court's ruling in that case into question.
Electromation, Inc.,6 the most renowned decision by the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board") on the subject of nonunion
employee involvement, illustrates how Section 8(a)(2) restricts labor-
management communication at the workplace. In that case, a
financially strapped electrical components manufacturer endeavored
to cut its expenses by distributing year-end lump-sum payments to
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
2. The term "trade union" is used in this article to refer to the same thing that the
word "union" ordinarily refers to in the labor relations context, that is, to an organization
that is not sponsored by an employer and that engages in collective bargaining with one or
more employers on behalf of employees. The term "trade union" is used to differentiate
the organizations so named from company unions. On the other hand, the term
"nonunion," rather than "non-trade-unionized," is used to describe those employees or
workplaces that are not organized by a trade union.
3. See, e.g., Senator Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1934, § 9, at 1, reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1935) and in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 23-25
(1949) [hereinafter NLRA LEG. HisT.].
4. For a sample of this extensive commentary, see Kenneth T. Lopatka, A
Contemporary First Amendment Analysis of the NLRA Section 8(a) (2)-2(5) Anachronism,
2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 3 n.2 (2007).
5. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
6. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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employees, in lieu of giving them a wage increase, and altering its
employee attendance bonus policy! In an effort to respond to its
employees' dissatisfaction with these changes, the company's
management conceived the idea of establishing "Action Committees"
as a way of involving employees in the effort to devise proposals that
would address employees' concerns while respecting the company's
budgetary constraints.! After the company's president sounded the
idea out on a selected group of eight employees, the company posted
a memorandum addressed to all employees announcing the formation
of the Action Committees.! This memorandum identified the general
topic that each committee was to address; explained that each
committee would consist of six employees, the company's Employees
Benefits Manager and one or two other members of management;
and instructed interested employees to sign up on posted sign-up
sheets that described the responsibilities and goals of each committee
in more detail.'0
The evidence indicated that employees' participation on the
ultimately short-lived committees was entirely voluntary. And the
committee meetings themselves appear to have been conducted in an
atmosphere that was conducive to uninhibited discussion by the
committees' employee members." Thus, the committees appear to
have been an example of willing speakers engaged in discussions
regarding subjects of mutual interest. Nevertheless, the Board found
that the committees fell within the broad parameters of Section 2(5)'s
definition of a labor organization and that by establishing the
committees; determining and limiting the subject matter each
committee was to address; determining how each committee was to
be composed; and appointing management representatives to the
committees, the company dominated the formation and
administration of this labor organization in violation of Section
8(a)(2)." It also found that the company unlawfully furthered its
domination of the committees by furnishing them with writing
materials, a calculator, and meeting space and permitting committee
members to carry out committee activities on paid time." Following
7. Id. at 990.
8. Id. at 991.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 991, 1017.
11. Id. at 1017.
12. Id. at 997-98.
13. Id. at 998 & n.31, 1017.
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its usual practice in such cases, the Board ordered the company to
disestablish the committees.
This result was unsurprising given the Board's extensive prior
case law on Section 8(a)(2). Nevertheless, it is striking when
considered against the backdrop of the First Amendment's
protections of free speech. For the Supreme Court has long
recognized that employers and employees have a First Amendment
right to engage in noncoercive communications regarding workplace
issues." True, the Board did not specifically rule that the committees'
discussions were unlawful, but only that the employer's involvement
in the formation and administration of the committees and the
employer's financial and material support of them were; yet it is well
established that a statute that suppresses speech does not circumvent
First Amendment scrutiny merely because it is targeted at ancillary
conduct, such as the "hiring [of] a hall" or the "expenditure of
money" for "printing, paper, and circulation costs," designed to
facilitate the making or dissemination of speech, and not the speech
itself. 6 How, then, could it be supposed that such an order would fail
to raise serious First Amendment concerns?
The prolonged quiescence on this subject in the law journals was
brought to an end by Kenneth Lopatka. In his article, A
Contemporary First Amendment Analysis of the NLRA Section
8(a)(2)-2(5) Anachronism," Lopatka argues that Section 8(a)(2), in
combination with Section 2(5), constitutes a constitutionally invalid
content-based regulation of speech. As he explains, owing to the fact
that Section 2(5) limits the application of the term "labor
organization" to those employee committees that exist for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
the subjects enumerated in Section 2(5),
the legality of an employer's conduct vis-A-vis an
employee committee turns on the subjects the
employer and the group of employees discuss. An
employer may establish and/or support any committee
or group of employees it likes, and the employer and
these employees may make and respond to each
14. Id. at 998.
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-19 (1969); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-04 (1940).
16. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
17. 2 Charleston L. Rev. 1 (2007).
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other's proposals on subjects such as enhancing
product quality through research and development
initiatives, improving morale by increasing social
interaction, strengthening customer relations, or
developing marketing ideas, without violating Section
8(a)(2) . ... But if their bilateral exchange turns to any
of those subjects mentioned in Section 2(5)-
"grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment or conditions of work,"-the employer
violates the law. Thus, if the topic of discussion is
product safety or the safety of employees en-route to
and from work, there is no violation, but if the topic is
workplace safety, a violation occurs. Similarly,
although no liability attaches to a discussion about
improving productivity through new production
processes or equipment, a discussion about improving
productivity through new attendance rules or reduced
staffing begets liability."'
Lopatka argues that such distinctions run afoul of the general
rule against content-based regulations of speech, that is, against
regulations that differentiate identical modes of speech or conduct
based on the content of the speech associated with it." He further
argues that because Section 8(a)(2), in conjunction with Section 2(5),
is a content-based regulation of speech, it cannot be justified either as
a regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech or as a regulation
of conduct." Lopatka concludes that there is "a strong case for the
proposition that the Board's historical construction of Sections
8(a)(2) and 2(5) violates the First Amendment" and, assuming this
defect to exist, it "cannot be corrected unless the Board abandons its
broad, literal application of the Section 8(a)(2)-2(5) scheme and
requires proof that an employer has coerced employees before
finding an employer's sponsorship or support of a dialogue about [the
subjects listed in Section 2(5)] is unlawful."2 1
Although, as I argue below, Lopatka's conclusion appears sound,
it is not clear that his argument supports it. Not all regulations that
discriminate on the basis of the subject matter of speech violate the
18. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 6-7 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2006)).
19. Id. at 9-12.
20. Id. at 27-28, 32-35.
21. Id. at 5.
Summer 2013] WORKPLACE SPEECH RIGHTS 681
First Amendment. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring
opinion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,' the Supreme Court has "upheld
a city law that permitted commercial advertising, but prohibited
political advertising, on city buses" and "a state law that restricted the
speech of state employees, but only as concerned partisan political
matters."2 Presumably, as he further pointed out, "the Government
[also] may choose to limit advertisements for cigarettes, but not for
cigars; choose to regulate airline advertising, but not bus advertising;
or choose to monitor solicitation by lawyers, but not by doctors." 24
Indeed, were a regulation that distinguished between an employee
committee that deals with management regarding "grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work" ("terms and conditions of employment") and one that deals
with management regarding other subjects always invalid under the
First Amendment, then Lopatka's proposed solution-that the Board
require proof that an employer has coerced employees before finding
that the employer's sponsorship or support of a dialogue about terms
and conditions of employment is unlawful-would not remedy
Section 8(a)(2)'s constitutional defect, as the Board would continue
to inspect the subjects discussed by employees and management to
determine if the employer's conduct violated Section 8(a)(2).
And there are, in fact, good reasons for believing that the
distinction that the Wagner Act Congress drew between employee
committees that deal with an employer concerning terms and
conditions of employment and employee committees that deal with
an employer concerning other subjects is a permissible one under the
Supreme Court's current case law. In R.A. V., the Supreme Court
struck down a St. Paul ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to
'"place[] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti. . . which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color creed, religion or gender,'". but that, as the Court
observed, did not cover words or symbols intended to "express
hostility" on some other ground, "for example, on the basis of
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality."2 6
22. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
23. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 380 (majority opinion) (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990)).
26. Id. at 391.
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Although noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court had "limited the
reach of the ordinance to conduct that amount[ed] to fighting
words,"" a category of speech that is not protected by the First
Amendment, the Court found that "the ordinance [wa]s facially
unconstitutional in that it prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."" The Court
found it particularly objectionable that the ordinance was not neutral
with respect to the viewpoints expressed, in that the ordinance
permitted a speaker to "hold up a sign saying, for example, that all
'anti-catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are." 9
The Court opined, however, that "the prohibition against content
discrimination ... is not absolute"30 and suggested that a content-
based regulation of speech might be justified under the First
Amendment if a "neutral" reason could be adduced for it.Y
Such a reason can be advanced on behalf of Section 8(a)(2). In
passing the Wagner Act, Congress sought to restore equality of
bargaining power between employers and workers and, thereby,
increase worker wage rates and purchasing power." Senator Wagner
and other congressional proponents of the Act were of the opinion
that company unions were ill-suited to rectify the imbalance of
bargaining power between employers and workers because they
subscribed to the not unreasonable view that a committee that is
created and financially supported by an employer and that is
composed of persons employed by that employer generally will be
subservient to the employer's wishes.33
Congress' differentiation of committees that deal with an
employer regarding terms and conditions of employment from
committees that deal with an employer regarding other matters-
including principally "so-called 'managerial' matters such as product
27. Id. at 380.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id. at 391-92.
30. Id. at 387.
31. Id. at 388.
32. See Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 74-1147, at 18 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra
note 3, at 3067; 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 2333-2334; Wagner, supra note 3, reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 24.
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quality or sales"4 or "improving productivity through new production
processes or equipment""-is understandable when considered in the
context of Congress' overarching purpose of increasing employees'
bargaining power. Whether an employee committee increases the
bargaining power of the employees that the committee represents is
generally only a matter of concern when the committee deals with an
employer concerning matters about which the employer and the
employees have conflicting interests or about which one or both of
the parties perceive the employer and the employees to have
conflicting interests. By that measure, employee committees that deal
with an employer regarding terms and conditions of employment
differ in degree from employee committees that deal with an
employer regarding product quality, sales or other managerial issues,
as the latter committees are more apt to be exclusively concerned
with ways of increasing an employer's revenues or reducing an
employer's non-labor-related operating costs, areas in which
employees' and their employer's interests generally coincide, and less
apt to be concerned with how to distribute whatever is left over when
one subtracts these costs from an employer's revenues between
employees and their employer, an area in which their perceived self-
interests are more apt to conflict. The greater propensity of
employee committees that discuss terms and conditions of
employment with management to implicate the concern of
employees' bargaining power vis-A-vis employers supports the view
that the distinction that Congress drew between these committees and
committees that discuss other subjects was a constitutionally
16permissible one.
34. William B. Gould IV, Employee Participation and Labor Policy: Why the TEAM
Act Should Be Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 3, 10 (1996).
35. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 7.
36. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707, 723-24 (2000) (upholding Colorado
statute, which forbade any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to
"'knowingly approach' within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent,
'for the purpose of... engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other
person,"' and distinguishing it from the content-based ordinance struck down in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92-93 (1972), which forbade picketing
within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school other than peaceful picketing relating
to a labor-management dispute involving the school, on the grounds that the speech
activities that the Colorado statute restricted-"oral protest, education, or counseling"-
were those most likely to be associated with the evils that the statute sought to avert, i.e.,
"the harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the following, the dogging, and
the implied threat of physical touching" of patients entering a health care facility, whereas
the ordinance in Mosley distinguished instances of speech that were similarly likely to
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The legislative history of the Wagner Act does not suggest that
Congress exempted committees that deal with an employer regarding
product quality, sales, and other managerial issues from Section
8(a)(2)'s proscriptions because it had a preference for such speech.
To the contrary, one of the Wagner Act's principal purposes was to
promote collective bargaining between employers and employees
regarding terms and conditions of employment." Nor does the
legislative history suggest that Congress singled out committees that
deal with an employer regarding terms and conditions of employment
for regulation because it wished to suppress the expression of any
particular point of view. Although employers often used company
unions as vehicles for proselytizing their view of business
economics-specifically, that "the interests of management and labor
are identical" 3-the Wagner Act left employers free to convey this
message to employees and their bargaining representatives. Senator
Wagner hoped to promote cooperation between labor and
management, but believed that genuine cooperation between them
was possible only when they bargained with each other as equals."
However, to say that Congress' discrimination between
committees that deal with an employer regarding terms and
conditions of employment and committees that deal with an employer
regarding other subjects was in itself unobjectionable is not to say
that Section 8(a)(2) is free from constitutional fault. Seemingly the
more fundamental reason why Section 8(a)(2), as applied by the
Board, violates the First Amendment is that it largely eliminates the
most effective means by which private-sector employers can
communicate regarding terms and conditions of employment with
nonunion employees: group discussion.
In this article, I expand on this First Amendment objection to the
Board's historical application of Section 8(a)(2). I first examine the
restrictions that the Board imposes pursuant to Section 8(a)(2) on the
raise the concerns to which the ordinance responded (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-
122 (3) (1999))).
37. See Wagner Act, § 1, 49 Stat. at 449-50.
38. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 73rd Cong. 680 (1934) (statement of Leslie Vickers, Economist, Am.
Transit Ass'n), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 718; see also NAT'L
INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., EXPERIENCE WITH WORKS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED
STATES, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 50, at 6, 170 (1922).
39. See Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 9, 11 (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 39, 41; 78 CONG. REC. 3444 (1934)
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 17.
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freedom of employers to initiate, administer and support nonunion
employee involvement committees. I argue that these restrictions
constitute restrictions on protected speech and that the Supreme
Court's apparent finding to the contrary in Cabot Carbon Co. is at
odds with the Court's subsequent First Amendment case law.
Having concluded that Section 8(a)(2), as applied by the Board,
restricts freedoms protected by the First Amendment, I then turn to a
consideration of the two principal rationales for Section 8(a)(2): (1)
that company unions, which Section 8(a)(2) was designed to
eradicate, and the conduct engaged in by employers in promoting
them coerce employees and (2) that company unions provide the
appearance, but not the substance, of collective bargaining, thus
leading employees to forego representation by a bona fide union,
contrary to their best interests. Although Supreme Court precedent
would suggest that restrictions on the freedom of employers and
employees to discuss terms and conditions of employment are subject
to strict scrutiny, for the sake of making all possible allowances for
Section 8(a)(2), I will assume that the intermediate level of scrutiny
that the Supreme Court applies to restrictions on commercial speech
is the appropriate one and that, as a consequence, the restrictions on
speech that the Board imposes pursuant to its interpretation of
Section 8(a)(2) can be justified if they "directly advance" a
"substantial" governmental interest and are "'narrowly drawn.'"" I
argue, however, that these rationales are inadequate even under this
more forgiving standard of review.
Concurring with Lopatka, I conclude that Section 8(a)(2) can be
saved from First Amendment infirmity if the Board requires proof
that an employer's initiation, administration or support of any
committee or other vehicle through which management and
employees discuss workplace issues has coerced employees before
finding that conduct to be unlawful under Section 8(a)(2). Like
Lopatka, I argue that Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
amended the Wagner Act, provides a statutory sanction for
demanding such proof, albeit for different reasons than he suggests.
Finally, this article is primarily concerned with Section 8(a)(2)'s
application to the nonunion workplace. Although much of the First
Amendment analysis here is equally germane to the trade-unionized
workplace, the trade-unionized workplace introduces certain
40. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65
(1980) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,438 (1978)).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
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complicating factors to the analysis-including, most importantly, the
implication of the government's interest in protecting a trade union's
bargaining relationship with an employer from being undermined by
the employer's dealings with other employee groups within the
bargaining unit-that are beyond the scope of the argument here.
Given that approximately ninety-two percent of non-agricultural
workers in the American private sector-the workers to whom, with
some exceptions, the Wagner Act, as amended, applies4-are not
represented by a trade union," this focus seems justified.
I. The Company Union Ban
A. Company Unionism Prior to the Wagner Act
The legislative history of the Wagner Act" leaves no doubt that
Congress' immediate objective in passing Section 8(a)(2) was to
eliminate the company union.45 The term "company union" referred
42. Section 2(3) of the Wagner Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006), provides
that, when used in the Act,
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer,.. . but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status
of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the
Railway Labor Act....
43. See Barry Hirsch & David Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage, Density,
and Employment Among Private Sector Nonagricultural Workers, 1973-2012,
UNIONSTATS.COM, http://www.unionstats.com (follow "html" hyperlink below "I. U.S.
Historical Tables: Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment, 1973-2012,
Private Nonagricultural") (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
44. The legislative history referred to in this article includes not only the
congressional hearings and debates on the National Labor Relations Bill that Senator
Wagner introduced in the Senate on February 21, 1935, see 79 CONG. REC. 2368 (1935),
reprinted in 1 LEG. HIsT. OF NLRA, supra note 3, at 1311, and that, with some
modification, was enacted into law, but also the congressional hearings and debates on the
Labor Disputes Bill that Senator Wagner introduced the previous year. See S. 2926, 73rd
Cong. (1934) (as introduced by Senator Wagner, March 1, 1934), reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1-14. This predecessor bill also contained provisions aimed at
the eradication of the company union, albeit ones less finely tuned than the ones
contained in the 1935 bill that became law. See id. §§ 3(5), 5(3)-(4), reprinted in 1 NRLA
LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 2-3. This legislative history is compiled in a two-volume
publication by the Board. See NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3.
45. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 74-1147, at 17 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST.,
supra note 3, at 3066-67; S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 9-11 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG.
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to a variety of committees or networks of committees that employers
established in order to deal with their employees regarding workplace
issues on a collective basis. The designation of these committees as
"ccompany unions" reflected the recognition of the fact that the plans
from which these committees emerged generally "confin[ed] both the
jurisdiction of the employees' representative[s] and the parties
eligible to be selected as such to workers employed at an individual
plant."* Growing from something of a novelty on the American
industrial scene prior to America's entry into World War I, company
unions came to represent an estimated 2,500,000 workers at the time
of the passage of the Wagner Act, or approximately three-fifths the
number of American workers represented by trade unions at that
time.48
B. The Legislative Effort to Eliminate Company Unions
The company unions that emerged prior to the Wagner Act
exhibited a broad range of structural, procedural, and jurisdictional
differences. A task of legislative draftsmanship that presented itself
to the Wagner Act's framers, therefore, was to devise a prohibition
broad enough to encompass these various entities, yet precise enough
not to interfere with practices inhering in collective bargaining
relationships between employers and trade unions. The Wagner
Act's framers performed this task by dividing it into two parts. First,
they defined the term "labor organization" in Section 2(5) in a way
broad enough to subsume most employee groups that discuss terms
and conditions of employment with an employer. Second, through
Section 8(a)(2), they prohibited those forms of employer conduct that
were endemic to employers' relationships with company unions, but
not to employers' relationships with trade unions. As discussed
HIST., supra note 3, at 2309-10; 79 CONG. REC. 2371-72 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1312-13.
46. Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 520 (1986); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS 1935, BULLETIN No.
634, JUNE 1937, at 108, 120-21 (1938).
47. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion
Employee Representation in the Pre-Wagner Years: A Reassessment, in NONUNION
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 21,
23 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000) ("At the start of American
involvement in the war in 1917, ... nonunion representation plans covered a few thousand
workers in a dozen or so plants .... ).
48. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT 79-80
(1935).
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below, the statutory scheme the Wagner Act's framers selected
significantly impairs the ability of employers and nonunion employees
to address their mutual affairs through the generally preferred means
of group discussion.
1. Section 2(5)'s Definitional Criteria
Section 2(5)'s text49 points to four criteria that an employee
group must satisfy to be a labor organization under the Wagner Act.
First, the group must be "an organization of any kind, an agency,
employee representation committee or plan." Intended by Congress
to apply to a wide array of entities, this already broad definitional
language has been interpreted expansively by the Board. Thus, the
Board has ruled that "[any group ... may meet the statutory
definition of 'labor organization' even if it lacks a formal structure,
has no elected officers, constitution or by-laws, does not meet
regularly, and does not require the payment of initiation fees or
dues."so And the Board has indicated that this group need not be any
determinate group of employees within a workforce. For instance, in
Grouse Mountain Associates II," the Board found that a program of
monthly meetings in which all employees were free to participate
constituted a labor organization despite the fact that the number of
employees in attendance at any one meeting ranged between four and
twenty; "that few, if any, employees attend[ed] every such meeting";
and that those who attended were free to make suggestions or to
respond to suggestions or comments by others as they so chose."
The Board has found that an employee group cannot be a labor
organization if it consists of the entire employee complement." This
exception aside, virtually any employee group that engages in face-to-
face discussions with management will satisfy this criterion.
Second, "employees," as defined by Section 2(3) of the Wagner
Act,' must participate in the group. A rare point of contention with
respect to this element of the definition of "labor organization"
concerns whether a single individual can constitute a labor
organization, with the Board finding that an individual can be one if
49. See supra note 1.
50. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994).
51. 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 F. App'x 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 1335.
53. See Gen. Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1232, 1234 (1977).
54. See supra note 42.
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other employees authorize that individual to represent them in
negotiations with management" and the D.C. and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeals expressing a contrary view. 6 There is little reason
to suppose, however, that an employee involvement committee that
contains two or more actively participating statutory employees
would fail to satisfy this criterion.
Third, the employees must "deal[] with" an employer. As the
Board has explained, "'dealing with' contemplates 'a bilateral
mechanism involving proposals from the employee committee
concerning the subjects listed in Section 2(5), coupled with real or
apparent consideration of those proposals by management.""' The
"dealing with" component of the definition of a labor organization is
satisfied if there exists "a pattern or practice in which a group of
employees, over time, makes proposals to management [and]
management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection
by word or deed" or if "the group exists for a purpose of following
such a pattern or practice." 8
The requirement that management respond in some way to an
employee group's proposals would seem to exempt few employee
involvement committees from Section 8(a)(2)'s prohibitions. It is the
rare case in which an employee group meets with management on a
recurring basis, makes proposals to management, and does not
receive some verbal response from management indicating
acceptance or rejection of one or more of these proposals over the
course of time. Besides which, as the requisite "deed" that may serve
in lieu of a verbal response to a proposal under this requirement may
be the implementation of an employee group's proposal, then any
employee group that "over time, makes proposals" will "deal[] with"
management if management implements any of them. 9  Not
55. Grand Union Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1665, 1666 (1959), remanded sub nom. Schultz v.
NLRB, 284 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
56. See Schultz v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 254, 256-59 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (finding that an
individual is not comprehended by the term "labor organization" either as this term is
defined in Section 2(5) or as it is used in proviso in Section 8(a)(3) authorizing certain
union security agreements), remanding Grand Union Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1665 (1959);
United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417, 422 (2nd Cir. 1955) ("It involves a straining of the
language of Section 2(5) to have the term 'labor organization,' which normally imports a
collective body or group, cover an individual."), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 299
(1956).
57. Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424, 424-25 (1999) (quoting Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994)).
58. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
59. See Miller Indus. Towing Equip., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1074, 1089 (2004).
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surprisingly, then, litigation over whether an employee involvement
group has dealt with an employer has tended to focus on whether the
employees have made the requisite "proposals" to management and
not on whether management has responded to them.6
One barrier to an employer's efforts to discuss workplace issues
with an employee group yet avoid dealing with it in the manner
described by the Board is the ill-defined line between the expression
of views and opinions, on the one hand, and proposals, on the other.
In Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., the Board ruled that "the
presentation to management of employee 'views,' without specific
recommendations as to what action is needed to accommodate those
views, constitutes 'dealing' with management under Section 2(5)."62
However, in E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,63 the Board appeared to
retrench from this position when it indicated that it would not find
that an employee committee "deal[s] with" an employer when no
"proposals" are made." The Board offered the example of a
'brainstorming' group" whose "purpose ... is simply to develop a
whole host of ideas" as an example of an employee group that makes
no proposals and, hence, does not deal with management.
But, upon closer inspection, the freedom to engage in
brainstorming proves to be a largely illusory one in the context of a
discussion regarding terms and conditions of employment. Such
matters as wages, hours, conditions of work, and the like are rarely so
complex that employees are unable to discern on which side of an
issue their interests lie. And if the relationship between the
implementation of an idea and employees' interests is clear, the
distinction between presenting an idea and advancing a proposal all
but disappears. An employee's observation that a certain air
conditioner is providing inadequate cooling for employees can just as
easily be characterized as a proposal to do something about the air
conditioning than as a mere observation on the functioning or
capacity of a piece of equipment.
The further requirement suggested by the Board in E. L du Pont
de Nemours & Co. that the proposals presented by an employee
60. See, e.g., Syracuse Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 755, 758 (2007); Dillon Stores, 319
N.L.R.B. 1245, 1251-52 (1995).
61. 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962).
62. Id. at 995.
63. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
64. Id. at 894.
65. Id.
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group to management be "group" ones6 would seem to afford an
employer no additional freedom to obtain an employee group's input
regarding terms and conditions of employment. In Polaroid Corp.,67
the Board found that Polaroid's Employee-Owners' Influence
Council ("EOIC") advanced group proposals to management on the
basis of evidence that at a number of the committee's meetings
Polaroid's management had attempted to ascertain the majority view
of the committee's members, either by polling committee members
or, as at one meeting, encouraging them to pare down the number of
suggestions they generated to a handful with which they generally
could agree. 8 The Board found that "polling individual viewpoints,
or otherwise ascertaining the majority view, inherently... gauges
group opinion."6 And, apparently, in the Board's estimation, gauging
an employee's opinion is tantamount to eliciting a proposal from that
employee when the opinion concerns the employee's approval or
disapproval of a proposal, whether that proposal has been advanced
by another employee or by management. 70
The notion that an employer solicits a group proposal from an
employee group by attempting to ascertain the majority view of its
members regarding a proposal creates a number of uncertainties for
employers endeavoring to operate lawful employee involvement
programs. Polaroid Corp. makes clear that no particular method of
ascertaining the majority view, such as a show of hands or ballot, is
required to transform the solicitation of individual views into polling.
In one of the instances of polling relied upon by the Board, the
polling consisted of nothing more than a management representative
suggesting that they "get a sense of where people are on this [the issue
of whether sexual harassment should be included in the company's
termination policy]" by "'go[ing] around [the room and] say[ing] it's
OK, or pass, or mak[ing] a comment"' and employees responding to
this suggestion either by making a comment or by indicating their
agreement with what was said before by saying "'ditto' or "nodd[ing]
their heads."" But if polling can arise through such informal means,
at what point must the solicitation of individual views stop before it
becomes an impermissible form of polling? Would polling occur if,
66. Id.
67. 329 N.L.R.B. 424 (1999).
68. See id. at 427-31.
69. Id. at 431.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 427.
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after an employer solicited the views of a minority of the employees
on an employee committee, other committee members volunteered
their opinions unsolicited, thus enabling the employer to ascertain the
majority view of the committee's members? Might not an employer
get a sense of an employee group's general leanings regarding a
proposal merely by being attentive to the group members' verbal and
non-verbal responses to it?
Moreover, as the Board has found that the "dealing with"
component of the definition of a labor organization is satisfied if an
employee "group exists for a purpose of [dealing with an
employer],"7 2 the Board may find that an employee group deals with
an employer even if the employer does not solicit the views of a
majority of the group's members about any of its proposals on the
theory that the employer solicited the views of individual members of
the group for the purpose of divining the group's majority view. The
ease with which the solicitation of individual views can slide into the
elicitation of a majority opinion or be construed by the Board as
attempting to ascertain a group's majority opinion would seem to
deter any legally circumspect employer from relying on any supposed
non-group-proposal-making-committee exception to Section 8(a)(2)'s
proscriptions.
A greater degree of legal certainty is permitted to those
employers prepared to delegate an employee group actual authority
with respect to matters it discusses with management. In General
Foods Corp.," the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's
("ALJ's") finding that a job enrichment program the employer had
established at one of its plants was not a labor organization.4 Under
this program, the plant's workforce was divided into four teams.
Acting by consensus, each team made job assignments to individual
team members, assigned job rotations, and scheduled overtime.
Individual members of different teams also served together on
committees that interviewed job applicants and made safety
inspections of the plant." The ALJ found that the job enrichment
program involved the "delegat[ion]" of "managerial functions" to
72. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
73. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
74. Id. at 1232, 1235.
75. Id. at 1233.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1235.
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employees, not dealing between employees and management." As
the ALJ explained, the additional functions performed by employees
under the program "were just other assignments of job duties, albeit
duties not normally granted to rank-and-file personnel."79
The Board has observed that an employee group deals with
management if the group presents proposals to management and
management has the power to reject them." It also has found that in
exercising this power to reject employees' proposals, "it makes no
real difference whether [management representatives] do so from
inside or outside the committee [that formulates them]."' However,
the Board has indicated that no dealing would occur "if the
committee were governed by majority decision-making, management
representatives were in the minority, and the committee had the
power to decide matters for itself, rather than simply make proposals
to management.""
The fourth definitional element of a labor organization that must
be satisfied is that these dealings must concern "grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." The Board has found that a committee may satisfy this
condition even if the committee spends most of its time discussing
other subjects,' although the Board has found that an isolated
discussion of terms and conditions of employment will not necessarily
transform a committee into a statutory labor organization." It also is
not necessary for an employer to be the party that initiates a
committee's discussion concerning a Section 2(5) subject for the
Board to conclude that one of the committee's purposes is to deal
with the employer regarding that subject-management's mere
response to proposals suggested by employees being sufficient to
establish such a purpose." The Board thus places an affirmative
78. Id
79. Id.
80. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895 (1993).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Reno Hilton, 319 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1157 (1995).
84. Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18, 20 (1995); see also Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B.
53, 54 (1995).
85. See Vic Koenig Chevrolet, 321 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1255, 1284 (1996), enforced in part,
enforcement denied in part on other grounds, 126 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 1997); Aero Detroit,
Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1101, 1113-14 (1996), affid in part, rev'd in part and remanded on
other grounds sub nom. APX Int'l v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1998).
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obligation on an employer to police discussions with employees to
ensure that they do not tread into impermissible areas.6
Finally, the Board has not determined whether an employee
group can be a labor organization if it doesn't represent other
employees in its dealings with management. The Board expressly
declined to decide this issue in Electromation, Inc.V and has avoided a
definitive resolution of the question since then. Even assuming,
however, that an employee group cannot be a labor organization
unless it represents other employees in some way, the Board has not
been demanding as to either the kind or the quantity of evidence that
is needed to satisfy this possible requirement. For instance, in Grouse
Mountain Associates II,' the Board adopted the ALJ's finding that
the employer violated Section 8(a)(2) and, thus, implicitly, his finding
that a Quality Assurance program had the purpose of representing
employees." Yet, in support of this finding, the ALJ cited only the
program's use by the employer "for the development of the process
for determining the holidays, for which employees would be paid time
and one half, and for determining the types of lunches, which would
be provided to employees," and comments by the manager who
chaired the program's monthly meetings suggesting that the employer
viewed the program as "some sort of employee representative
entity.""
Although, in Polaroid Corp.,9' the Board reserved judgment on
the ALJ's finding that Polaroid's "operation of the EOIC to 'reflect'
the views of the employee population was tantamount to the EOIC
acting in a representational capacity vis-A-vis the employee
population," the Board has routinely considered evidence that an
employer has selected a committee's members to reflect some
departmental or other cross-section of the workforce as evidence that
a committee acts in that capacity." And the Board considers virtually
any evidence that a committee member has relayed or was asked to
relay a suggestion by an employee who is not a member of the
committee as sufficient to establish that the committee acts in a
86. See Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. at 1114; Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 19-21.
87. 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 n.20 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
88. 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 F. App'x 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 1322, 1336.
90. Id. at 1336.
91. 329 N.L.R.B. 424,434 n.29 (1999).
92. See, e.g., Miller Indus. Towing Equip., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1074,1074, 1089 (2004);
Simmons Indus., 321 N.L.R.B. 228, 228,253 (1996),
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representational capacity.' Thus, the Board effectively requires that
an employer ensure that committee members refrain from discussing
committee matters with non-participating employees altogether if the
employer wishes to take advantage of any hypothecated non-
representational-committee safe harbor from Section 8(a)(2). But,
even if it were feasible for an employer to stifle such communications,
shrouding an employee involvement committee's proceedings in
secrecy conflicts with some of the fundamental purposes of employee
involvement.'
It would appear, then, the possible isolated exception aside, that
the only way an employer can discuss terms and conditions of
employment with an employee group, achieve some of the usual
objectives of employee involvement through such discussions, and
have some degree of confidence that the group with which the
employer is having discussions is not a labor organization is by
delegating decision-making authority to the group over the matters
the employer discusses with it. Thus, whatever ways that a nonunion
employer can facilitate such discussions in those cases where the
employer chooses not to delegate such authority are by and large
those left open by Section 8(a)(2). However, these are extremely
limited.
2. Section 8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2)" was designed to erect a wall between employers
and what the Wagner Act defined as labor organizations.96 The basic
93. See, e.g., Miller Indus. Towing Equip., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. at 1074, 1089; Simmons
Indus., 321 N.L.R.B. at 228, 253-54.
94. Among the historical objectives of employee involvement is to instill in
employees greater feelings of personal efficacy and of control over their working lives, it
being believed that these feelings have a salutary influence on employees' motivation,
satisfaction and willingness to cooperate with management in achieving organizational
goals. See JOHN L. COTrON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: METHODS FOR IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE AND WORK ATTITUDES 23, TABLE 2.1 (1993); EDWARD E. LAWLER III,
HIGH-INVOLVEMENT MANAGEMENT 26, 28-35 (1986); Kohler, supra note 46, at 516-17.
From the perspective of instilling these feelings in the broader workforce, however, an
employee committee that is walled off from other employees and to whose deliberations
non-members can neither contribute nor obtain information may be worse than useless.
At least when management sets terms and conditions of employment on a unilateral basis
management is free to consider the input of individual employees and to communicate
with employees regarding the course of its deliberations before a decision is reached.
95. See supra note 1.
96. This wall was not intended to be wholly impenetrable, as Congress did not wish
to prohibit practices that benefitted trade unions. Thus, Section 8(a)(2) allows an
employer to "permit[| employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of
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idea was that as employers and employees have an adversarial
relationship when dealing with each other concerning employees'
terms and conditions of employment, employers have an interest in
making the employees' representatives for dealing with employers
concerning these subjects as ineffective as possible.'
Section 8(a)(2) can be divided into two broad legal admonitions.
First, it provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
"employer"-a term which encompasses "any person acting as an
agent of an employer,"9 8 such as a member of an employer's
managerial or supervisory staff-"to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization." Although the
Board has allowed the possibility that an employer might not violate
Section 8(a)(2) "for merely suggesting to his employees that they
organize a union or a committee" that the employer can lawfully
recognize as their collective bargaining representative," provided the
time or pay." And Section 8(a)(3) of the Wagner Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(2006), permits an employer and a trade union lawfully recognized by the employer as its
employees' collective bargaining representative to enter into an agreement requiring as a
condition of employment that the employees become dues-paying members of that trade
union. An employer also may exert influence on a trade union through arms-length
collective bargaining. However, an employer was not to be permitted to influence a labor
organization "as an organic entity." National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958
Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 41 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1417; 79 CONG. REC. 7570
(1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 2334.
97. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 96, at 40 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner) ("The company dominated union is frequently supported in part or in whole by
the employer. I cannot comprehend how people can rise to the defense of a practice so
contrary to American principles as one which permits the advocates of one party to be
paid by the other."), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1416; Hearings on S.
2926, supra note 38, at 209 (statement of Dr. Paul H. Douglas, Professor of Econ., Univ. of
Chi., and member of the Consumers' Advisory Bd., Nat'l Recovery Admin.) ("[Tihe law
has long since recognized that a man should not serve adverse interests or represent both
buyer and seller in the same transaction or both debtor and creditor. The employer, or the
buyer of labor, can choose his own bargaining agency, but he is not to help the worker, or
the seller of labor to choose his."), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 239.
Senator Wagner often likened the situation faced by employees represented by a company
union to that of litigant whose attorney is compensated by the opposing party. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 96, at 395 (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1781; 79 CONG. REC. 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen.
Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 2334.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 2(2) (2006).
99. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 993 (1992) (quoting MEMORANDUM
COMPARING S. 1958, SEVENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, A BILL
INTRODUCED BY SENATOR WAGNER ON FEBRUARY 21,1935, To CREATE A NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, WITH THE BILL REPORTED BY
SENATOR WALSH ON MAY 26, 1934, AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR S. 2926, SEVENTY-THIRD
CONGRESS, ALSO INTRODUCED BY SENATOR WAGNER 27 (S. Comm. Print 1935),
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employer does not direct this suggestion to specific individuals or
present it as an alternative to joining some other trade union,"' the
Board has found that an employer violates Section 8(a)(2) if the
employer plays a more active role in bringing the organization into
existence or in affecting its subsequent character. Thus, the Board
has found that an employer violates Section 8(a)(2) if the employer
conceives the idea of a committee that falls within Section 2(5)'s
definition of a labor organization, announces the committee's
establishment and invites volunteers from its workforce to participate
on the committeeo' or, even if the idea for the committee comes from
an employee, if an employer "adopt[s]" the idea "and t[akes]
concrete steps to implement it by providing employees with the time
and place to meet in order to establish the committee.""'' Likewise,
the Board has found that an employer violates Section 8(a)(2) if the
employer plays a role in devising the criteria by which the members of
a committee that falls within the statutory definition of a labor
organization are selected or in determining how it is composed;'0 3
selects the topics that such a committee discusses 4 or the manner in
which they are discussed;o determines such a committee's purposes
or functions;"' participates in formulating such a committee's policies
and procedures or in selecting its chairman or other officers;" or
oversees the election of employees to such a committee.
reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF NLRA, supra note 3, at 1352), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994).
100. See, e.g., Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 n.2 (1994); Wheeler,
260 N.L.R.B. 867,867 (1982).
101. See, e.g., EFCO Corp. 327 N.L.R.B. 372, 372, 377 (1998), enforced, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10909 (4th Cir. 2000); Ryder Distribution Res., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814, 818
(1993); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990-91, 997 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148
(7th Cir. 1994).
102. Addicts Rehab. Ctr. Fund, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 733, 742 (2000).
103. See, e.g., Addicts Rehab. Ctr. Fund, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. at 733, 742; Webcor
Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1204 & n.8 (1995), enforced in pertinent part, 118 F.3d
1115 (6th Cir. 1997); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 990-91, 997-98.
104. See, e.g., Addicts Rehab. Ctr. Fund, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. at 733, 742; EFCO Corp.,
327 N.L.R.B. at 377; Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 997-98.
105. See Ryder Distribution Res., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. at 818.
106. See, e.g., Summa Health Sys., Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 1379, 1379,1382-83, 1385 (2000);
EFCO Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. at 377; Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 1204 & n.8.
107. See, e.g., Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083 n.2, 1086 (1994);
Oregon State Emps. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 976, 976, 993-94 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Addicts Rehab. Ctr. Fund, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. at 733, 742; Magan Med.
Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. at 1083 n.2, 1086.
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Second, Section 8(a)(2) provides that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to ... contribute financial or other support" to a
labor organization. In applying this injunction, the Board gives an
employer less latitude in cooperating with a non-majority
organization or committee, i.e., an organization or committee that has
not obtained authorization from an uncoerced majority of employees
to act as their collective bargaining agent, than with a lawfully
recognized representative.'" In the case of the former, the Board
condemns as unlawful all but the most minimal levels of employer
assistance.
In Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.,"1 the Board observed "that the use
of company time and property" by a nondominated, non-majority
labor organization, such as a trade union engaged in organizing, "does
not, per se, establish unlawful support and assistance."' In that case,
the Board concluded that the employer did not exceed the meager
level of employer assistance to a non-majority labor organization
tolerated by Section 8(a)(2) by permitting a trade union attempting to
organize its employees to meet with employees on company premises
because this occurred "at the end of the workday for all but five of
the employees" and these five employees constituted a mere "3
percent of the total work force.""2
But the Board has found even such modest forms of employer
assistance as furnishing meeting space or clerical supplies to a labor
organization to be unlawful where the employer has dominated the
organization's formation.' In such a case, the Board views the
employer's assistance as furthering the employer's unlawful
domination of the labor organization."'
Finally, the Board may find that an employer has violated
Section 8(a)(2) even if the employer does not play a role in the
formation or administration of a labor organization or extend
financial, material or logistical support to it. The Board has found
109. Gen. Counsel Memorandum No. 93-4 from Jerry M. Hunter, NLRB Gen.
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, Guideline
Memorandum Concerning Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB No. 163, at 14-15 (Apr. 15,
1993), available at 1993 NLRB GCM LEXIS 27, at *26-28.
110. 150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964).
111. Id. at 582.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Miller Indus. Towing Equip., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1074, 1090 (2004);
Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 & n.31 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994).
114. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 998 n.31.
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that an employer unlawfully supports a labor organization if the
employer "recognizes" a labor organization that has not been
authorized by an uncoerced majority of employees in an appropriate
unit to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining."' The
Board has found that an employer tacitly extends such recognition if
the employer bargains with a committee concerning one or more of
the subjects listed in Section 2(5)."' The Board does not require any
formal acknowledgment on the part of the employer that the labor
organization is an employee representative or the consummation of a
collective bargaining agreement."'
II. Section 8(a)(2) as a Regulation of Speech
A. First Amendment Protection for Employer-Employee Dialogue
Regarding Terms and Conditions of Employment
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the First
Amendment protects the freedom of private employers and their
employees to engage in a dialogue with each other concerning terms
and conditions of employment. However, there seems little reason to
doubt that it does. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the
First Amendment protects the right of employees to communicate
their dissatisfaction with their terms and conditions of employment to
the public."' And, in City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,"' the Court found
that, in the context of a School Board meeting at which the public was
invited to attend, a public school teacher, who was a member of a
bargaining unit that was represented by a union, but who was not a
member of that union, had the same right under the First
Amendment to criticize a union proposal that altered his terms and
conditions of employment as any member of the public and that,
consequently, the School Board could not be ordered to prohibit such
commentary on the grounds that it "constituted negotiation" between
the School Board and one of its employees in derogation of the
115. See Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1959), enforced
sub nom. ILGWU v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616 (DC Cir. 1960), affd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
116. See Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083,1083 n.2 (1994).
117. See id. at 1083 n.2, 1084-85.
118. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940).
119. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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School Board's obligation to bargain with the employee's bargaining
representative."2 0
The Supreme Court also has recognized a reciprocal right of free
speech on the part of employers. In Thomas v. Collins,"' the
Supreme Court affirmed that the First Amendment protects the right
of both employers and employees to engage in noncoercive "attempts
to persuade to action with respect to joining or not joining unions." 22
Later, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,'" the Supreme Court appeared
to eschew any subject matter limitation on an employer's right of free
speech in finding that the First Amendment's protections extended to
an employer's noncoercive communication of "his views to his
,,114 ct akn
employees. And, citing Gissel Packing Co., federal circuit courts
of appeals have found that an employer engaged in collective
bargaining negotiations with a trade union has a First Amendment
right to "speak freely to its employees about ... the status of
negotiations, outstanding offers, its position, [and] the reasons for its
position and to criticize the trade union's position in these
negotiations.126 It would be strange indeed if the First Amendment
protected an employer's freedom to communicate with employees
regarding its negotiations with a trade union, but did not protect an
employer's freedom to engage in those negotiations.
Outside the labor relations context, the Supreme Court has
found that the First Amendment protects the right to solicit
information or responses.' 7 When this right is combined with the
right of employers and employees to express their views regarding
employees' terms and conditions of employment, it would seem to
yield a right on the part of employers and employees to engage in a
dialogue with each other regarding these subjects, if only because
120. Id. at 174-75; see also Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 313 (1979)
(noting "that the Constitution guarantees [private employees] the right individually or
collectively to voice their views to their employers").
121. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
122. Id. at 537.
123. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
124. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
125. Americare Pine Lodge Nursing and Rehab. Ctr. v. NLRB, 164 F. 3d 867, 875 (4th
Cir. 1999).
126. See NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., United Techs. Corp., 789 F.2d 121,
134 (2nd Cir. 1986).
127. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 764-66 (1993); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
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such a dialogue consists of a process in which both parties express
their views and solicit information and responses from the other.'
Although Section 8(a)(2)'s proscriptions are targeted at
employers, in their actual application they also burden employees'
exercise of their rights of free speech. Under the Board's
longstanding interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), an employer is
prohibited from conditioning its willingness to enter into discussions
with an employee group regarding terms and conditions of
employment on the group's willingness to discuss certain topics or its
willingness to include other employees in the discussions."' And,
under the same interpretation of this section, an employer is
prohibited from providing an employee group that falls within the
statutory definition of a "labor organization," but that has not been
authorized by an uncoerced majority of employees in an appropriate
unit to act as their collective bargaining agent, any significant material
or logistical support. But the former prohibition makes it more
difficult for a group of employees to obtain their employer's
agreement to enter into such discussions, an indispensable
prerequisite to them in the absence of any legal compulsion on the
employer to engage in them, while the latter deprives an employee
group of the support ordinarily needed by its members to
communicate with other interested employees. Such prohibitions
impinge on employees' and not merely employers' freedom of
speech.'
More importantly, Section 8(a)(2) deprives employees of the
opportunity to participate in employee involvement programs
initiated by employers. It is well established that the First
Amendment protects not only the right to speak, but also the right to
hear what a speaker has to say."' As the Supreme Court has
explained: "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But
128. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1996) (finding that the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 violated First Amendment by "suppressting] a large amount of
speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another").
129. See cases cited supra notes 103-04.
130. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) ("[C]ontribution restrictions could
have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and
political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."); cf
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (finding that North
Carolina law that prohibited professional fundraisers from charging a charity "an
'unreasonable' or 'excessive' fee" for their fundraising services violated charities' First
Amendment rights (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-17.2 (1986))).
131. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57 and cases cited; Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874.
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where a speaker exists,... the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.",1 2 And just as
restrictions on one person's freedom to speak impinge on other
persons' freedom to hear what that person has to say, so too
restrictions on the freedom of employers to initiate a dialogue
regarding terms and conditions of employment impinge on the
freedom of employees to participate in that dialogue.
The cumulative effect of the many ways that the Board's
application of Section 8(a)(2) restricts labor-management
communication is not insubstantial: As a practical matter they
preclude an employer and a nonunion employee group from
discussing terms and conditions of employment with each other
unless the employer delegates decision-making authority about the
matters the employer discusses with the group to the group. In doing
so, they largely eliminate as a vehicle for employer-nonunion
employee communication regarding terms and conditions of
employment what social psychologists, members of the business
academy, employers and others have long regarded as the most
effective way of communicating about a wide variety of workplace
issues: group discussion.
The cognitive and psychological benefits of various forms of
group discussion at the workplace have been attested to by numerous
observers." It has been noted that group discussion can have a
stimulating effect on the formation of ideas by the group's members,
as ideas advanced by one member may stimulate the formation and
presentation of ideas by other members of the group who might not
have formulated them on their own.'3 And the exposure of the
132. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
133. See, e.g., DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: How BUSINESS
AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 38-39, 43-46 (1995); ALEX F. OSBORN, APPLIED
IMAGINATION 151-193 (1963); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART &
PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 238-49 (1990); Dean Tjosvold,
Participation: A Close Look at its Dynamics, 13 J. MGMT. 739, 741 (1987)
("[C]omprehensive reviews indicate that several persons working in formal or informal
groups often solve problems more efficiently than individuals working alone.").
134. See, e.g., OSBORN, supra note 133, at 154; Vincent Brown, Michael Tumeo,
Timothy S. Larey & Paul B. Paulus, Modeling Cognitive Interactions During Group
Brainstorming, 29 SMALL GROUP RES. 495, 498 (1998); Simon Taggar, Group
Composition, Creative Synergy, and Group Performance, 35 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 261,
264-65 (2001). Research in the area of group brainstorming suggests that an employer can
increase the creative potential of an idea-generating group by selecting as its members
"people with diverse but overlapping knowledge domains and skills." Paul B. Paulus,
Groups, Teams, and Creativity: The Creative Potential of Idea-generating Groups, 49
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INT'L REV. 237, 251 (2000). But such conduct would be
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members of a group to conflicting views on an issue has been found to
encourage the search for additional information on all sides of that
issue, thereby expanding the pool of information upon which the
group draws in rendering its judgment.'" Likewise, it has been found
that participating in an employee involvement group that has a
meaningful role in organizational decision-making can increase
employees' "feelings of accomplishment and self-worth,"', their
"sense of power and dignity,"' and their willingness to cooperate
with management in achieving organizational goals.'" The process of
employees and managers working together to address common
problems also can build mutual trust between employees and
management, with effects that permeate the employment
relationship.'"
Common sense would further suggest that a face-to-face
discussion between managers and an employee group often is a more
effective means for employers and employees to exchange
information-historically, one of the most important functions of
employee involvement"-than the avenues that the Board leaves
open to employers and nonunion employees for communicating with
each other regarding terms and conditions of employment, including
principally managerial dealings with individual employees, suggestion
boxes, and employee opinion surveys.14' A face-to-face discussion
allows both parties to ask follow-up questions, to provide
clarification, to achieve consensus, and to identify areas of agreement
unlawful under the prevailing interpretation of Section 8(a)(2) if the group fell within
Section 2(5)'s diffuse definition of a "labor organization."
135. See Charlan Nemeth & Pamela Owens, Making Work Groups More Effective:
The Value of Minority Dissent, in HANDBOOK OF WORK GROUP PSYCHOLOGY 125, 137
(Michael A. West ed., 1996).
136. LAWLER, supra note 94, at 26.
137. LEVINE, supra note 133, at 39.
138. See LAWLER, supra note 94, at 30; LEVINE, supra note 133, at 38-39.
139. See LEVINE, supra note 133, at 39; Bruce E. Kaufman & David I. Levine, An
Economic Analysis of Employee Representation, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra note 47, at 149, 156-157.
140. See ERNEST R. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 67-68 (1926) (noting
that the most general function of company unions in the 1920s was to provide a forum for
the bilateral "exchange of information, opinions, and desires" between employees and
management); LAWLER, supra note 94, at 24-25; Gretchen Spreitzer, Taking Stock: A
Review of More Than Twenty Years of Research on Empowerment at Work, in 1 THE
SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 54, 56 (Julian Barling & Cary L.
Cooper eds., 2008).
141. See Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424, 425 & n.6 (1999); E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
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and disagreement with a subtlety that would be difficult to replicate
through suggestion boxes, employee opinion surveys and other non-
interactive modes of communication. And obviously an employer
usually can exchange information with employees more efficiently if
the employer is permitted to engage in face-to-face discussions with
an employee group or multiple employee groups than if the employer
is required to speak with each employee individually. The singular
value of group discussion at the workplace would seem to preclude
Section 8(a)(2) from being justified by loose analogy to
constitutionally permissible restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of speech, which must, inter alia, "'leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information,"' 42 a requirement
that the Supreme Court has found rules out restrictions on speech
that require speakers to utilize more burdensome or less "effective"
channels of communication 43 or that deprive speakers of a "unique
and important" means of engaging in the desired communications.'"
Section 8(a)(2) stands on no better footing as a putative
regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech because nonunion
employees can circumvent a number of the obstacles that it places in
the way of their communicating with their employer by becoming
unionized. Employees who wish to enter into discussions with
management regarding terms and conditions of employment may be
unable to persuade a majority of their co-workers of the merits of
joining or forming a trade union. And these employees' freedom to
discuss these subjects with their employer cannot be thwarted merely
because other employees choose not to exercise this freedom.145
There is, of course, also no guarantee that the employees who wish to
enter into a dialogue with management would be selected by other
employees to serve on the labor organization's bargaining committee.
It would appear, then, that Section 8(a)(2), as applied by the
Board, imposes significant restrictions on the freedom of employers
142. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984)).
143. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
144. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,54 (1994).
145. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859, 880 (1996) (finding that provisions in the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 that criminalized the "knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age" and the "knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a
person under 18 years of age" violated the First Amendment because, among other
reasons, they could enable an opponent of such speech to exercise a 'heckler's veto"' by
"simply log[ging] on [a website] and inform[ing] the would-be discoursers that his 17-year
old child... would be present").
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and nonunion employees to engage in speech that is protected by the
First Amendment and that the constitutional import of these
restrictions can't be minimized by reference to the remaining
channels they leave open to employers and nonunion employees to
communicate. Thus, some explanation is needed as to why Section
8(a)(2), as applied by the Board, does not violate the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court's terse offering in its 1959 decision
in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.' represents its only attempt at one.
B. The Cabot Carbon Co. Decision and its Continued Salience in
Contemporary First Amendment Jurisprudence
1. The Cabot Carbon Co. Decision
In Cabot Carbon Co., the controlling case as to the validity of
Section 8(a)(2) under the First Amendment, some affiliated
employers set up employee committees at their plants."' Bylaws for
these committees were prepared by the employers in collaboration
with employee representatives from their several plants and approved
by a majority of employees at each plant.'48 The bylaws provided that
the committees' purpose was to furnish "a procedure for considering
employees' ideas and problems of mutual interest to employees and
management." 49
In addition, a "Central Committee," consisting of the chairmen
of the plant committees, met annually with the affiliates' Director of
Industrial Relations.' This committee advanced a broad range of
proposals concerning the employment relationship, some of which
were approved by the Director.'5' However, neither the Central
Committee nor the various plant committees ever endeavored to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with any of the
employers.'52
The Board found that the employee committees were unlawfully
dominated labor organizations and ordered the employers to
disestablish them.'s The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
146. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
147. Id. at 205.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 208.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 209.
153. Id. at 209-210.
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refused to enforce this order, finding that the committees did not fall
within the Wagner Act's definition of a "labor organization" because
they did not engage in what was commonly understood as "collective
bargaining" and because, in its view, the Taft-Hartley Act's
amendment to Section 9(a) of the Wagner Act indicated that
Congress wanted to exclude such committees from this definition.,,'
The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
committees established by Cabot Carbon and its affiliates were labor
organizations. As Lopatka points out, the First Amendment issue
was given perfunctory treatment by the parties and the Court,"' with
a discussion of the issue occupying only two sentences of the Court's
opinion.' At any rate, the Court exhibited no hesitancy in rejecting
the employers' First Amendment challenge to the Board's application
of Section 8(a)(2), finding that Section 8(a)(2) does not limit free
speech but "merely precludes ... employers from dominating,
interfering with or supporting such employee committees which
Congress has defined to be labor organizations.""'
Although it would be hazardous to draw any firm conclusions
about the Court's reasoning from this Delphic pronouncement, which
does little more that restate Section 8(a)(2)'s prohibitions, what the
Court appears to have in mind is that Section 8(a)(2) does not violate
the First Amendment because it only regulates employers' conduct
(i.e., acts of domination, interference or support of labor
organizations) and, hence, is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny
154. Id. at 210. The proviso to Section 9(a) of the Wagner Act read:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(2006)). The Taft-Hartley Act added the following language to Section 9(a):
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been
given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 9(a), 61 Stat. 136, 143 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
159(a) (2006)).
155. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 31.
156. See Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 218.
157. Id.
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at all. This proposition, however, would not appear to survive the
Court's subsequent case law.
2. The Speech/Conduct Distinction
The Supreme Court has not returned to the specific First
Amendment question raised in Cabot Carbon Co., that is, whether
Section 8(a)(2), as applied by the Board, violates the First
Amendment. It has, however, frequently revisited the issue of line
drawing between protected speech and unprotected conduct, most
instructively in cases in which the Court addressed First Amendment
concerns relating to the regulation of expressive conduct or campaign
finance.
In United States v. O'Brien,' the Court ruled that provisions in
the Selective Service Act that made it unlawful for a draft registrant
to destroy his draft card did not violate the registrant's First
Amendment right to express his opposition to the Vietnam War and
the draft. In so finding, the Court explained "that when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms."" In the Court's view, this burden of
justification was met if the regulation "furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.""o
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court applied the O'Brien test
to restrictions on a variety of admixtures of speech and conduct."'
Notably, however, in Buckley v. Valeo,162 the Court found its analysis
in O'Brien to be inapplicable to restrictions on federal election
campaign contributions and expenditures.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered whether campaign
contribution and expenditure limits imposed by the Federal Election
158. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
159. Id. at 376.
160. Id. at 377.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985) (entering a
military base for the purpose of engaging in a peaceful demonstration); Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984) (posting signs on
public property); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(nude dancing).
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, violated the First
Amendment. The act imposed, inter alia, (a) a $1,000 limit on the
amount that an individual could contribute to the campaign of any
single candidate for federal elective office in any single election; (b) a
$1,000 limit on the amount that any individual could expend in an
election "'relative to a clearly identified candidate"'; (c) restrictions
on "a candidate's use of personal and family resources in his
campaign"; and (d) a limit on "the overall amount that c[ould] be
spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office."' 3 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals found and the government argued before
the Supreme Court that the act regulated conduct; "that its effect on
speech and association [wa]s incidental at most"; and that, therefore,
the act's campaign contribution and expenditure limitations were akin
to those provisions in the Selective Service Act that the Supreme
Court had upheld in O'Brien.*'
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this analogy. The Court
found that "[t]he expenditure of money simply cannot be equated
with such conduct as destruction of a draft card."6 6 The Court
observed that it had "never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to
introduce a non-speech element"'66 and noted that it had previously
"contrasted picketing and parading," which it had characterized as
"conduct 'intertwined with expression and association,"' with a
"newspaper comment and a telegram," which it had "described as a
'pure form of expression' involving 'free speech alone' rather than
'expression mixed with particular conduct.""' Yet, a newspaper
comment and telegram will usually require the expenditure of money
on some person's part. As the Court explained:
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or
leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs.
Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall
and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing
dependence on television, radio, and other mass media
163. Id. at 13 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1970)).
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 16.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 17 (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1965)).
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for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of
effective political speech."
The apparent import of the Court's discussion is that speech and
the dissemination of speech is so dependent on and intertwined with
certain types of conduct, such as expending money, printing and
distributing handbills or leaflets, or hiring a hall, that restrictions on
such ancillary conduct are tantamount to restrictions on the speech
itself. Stated another way, if the rights of free speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment are not to be rendered nugatory, then the First
Amendment must protect a variety of conduct, other than the moving
of lips and vocal chords, needed to effectuate communication
between a speaker and his or her intended audience. A ban on the
burning of draft cards is different in kind from a ban on the
expenditure of money, even though both types of conduct may have
as their purpose the promotion of a political message, since the
former limits only one means, and not a principal means, of
communicating opposition to a war or draft, whereas a ban on the
expenditure of money swallows up virtually every avenue for
disseminating the message that such conduct is intended to promote.
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
view that restrictions on such conduct as the expenditure of money or
the furnishing of "'goods, materials, services, or facilities"' are, when
this conduct is designed to facilitate the political expression of the
person, group or entity engaging in it, subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.' The Court also has found that the First
Amendment's protections extend to similar types of conduct when
such conduct is engaged in to facilitate other kinds of speech. For
instance, in Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. "0
and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., "
the Court found that state laws that limited what a professional
fundraiser could charge a charity for fundraising on the charity's
behalf violated the First Amendment. In both cases the Court
168. Id. at 19.
169. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (quoting MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. at 898; McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
170. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
171. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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reasoned that "'a direct restriction on the amount of money a charity
can spend on fundraising activity"' amounted to "'a direct restriction
on protected First Amendment activity., 72
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that regulations governing
the financing of commercial advertising implicate First Amendment
freedoms. In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,"' the Supreme
Court ruled that government-mandated assessments used primarily to
fund advertising promoting mushroom sales violated United Foods'
First Amendment right to refrain from subsidizing speech with which
it disagreed. The Court likened the assessments to compelled
subsidies of political speech that the Court had found
unconstitutional in earlier cases.174
Like the campaign finance regulations that the Court has
subjected to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, Section
8(a)(2) restricts the freedom of those regulated to expend money or
to furnish goods, materials, services, and facilities for the purpose of
fostering speech. In this regard, the principal difference between
Section 8(a)(2) and these campaign finance regulations is that Section
8(a)(2) leaves those regulated far less room to facilitate the
underlying speech.
The other conduct that Section 8(a)(2) prohibits-"the
dominat[ion] or interfere[nce] with the formation or administration of
any labor organization"-would appear to be even more closely
connected with pure speech than the provision of material, logistical
or financial support. As noted above, if a committee falls within
Section 2(5)'s broad definition of a labor organization, then, under
the prevailing interpretation of the Wagner Act, as amended, an
employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(2) if the employer initiates the committee's formation, plays a
role in selecting its participants, or decides which topics that it
discusses.17 ' But one cannot have a dialogue without someone
initiating it, engage in a dialogue regarding a particular topic without
someone choosing to discuss that topic, or actively seek a dialogue
with a specific group of individuals without interfering with the
process by which that group is formed. To deprive employers of the
172. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. at 788-89 (quoting Joseph H.
Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 967 & n.16).
173. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
174. Id. at 410-11, 413.
175. See cases cited supra notes 101, 103-04.
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right to engage in such conduct is to deprive employers and,
indirectly, employees of a substantial part of the right of free speech.
Conduct that is protected by the First Amendment can always be
described in a way that makes no reference to speech. For instance,
the managing editor of a newspaper might be said to "dominate" the
administration of the newspaper. And someone who conceives the
idea of a book club, selects the books to be read by its members,
places an advertisement in a newspaper inviting others to join, selects
the time and locale of the club's meetings, and serves as a moderator
at those meetings might be said to "dominate" the formation and
administration of the book club. But a statute designed to reduce or
eliminate the influence that a class of persons has over newspapers or
book clubs obviously would not escape First Amendment scrutiny
merely by describing the conduct it proscribes in this fashion."'
Similarly, Section 8(a)(2), which is designed to reduce the influence
that employers have over labor organizations, does not escape such
scrutiny by describing the conduct it prohibits in this way.
It would appear, then, that Section 8(a)(2) cannot escape First
Amendment scrutiny on the theory that it regulates conduct and not
speech. This, however, does not resolve the First Amendment issue.
For even "a significant interference with [First Amendment
freedoms] may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgement of [those] freedoms.""' Whether Section
8(a)(2), as applied by the Board, can be justified on this basis is
addressed below.
IH. Justifying Section 8(a)(2)'s Burden on Speech
A. The Standard of Review
The Supreme Court applies "strict" or "heightened scrutiny" to
restrictions on most types of speech when these restrictions cannot
otherwise be justified as mere regulations of the time, place, or
manner of speech."' Under this mode of review, a governmental
176. Cf Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (noting that the First
Amendment prohibits "[sipeech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker").
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 33,37 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that the "default category" of speech under the First
Amendment "is high-value speech," i.e., speech that receives the First Amendment's "full
protection").
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restriction on speech violates the First Amendment unless it "'is
necessary to serve a compelling [governmental] interest and ... is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.""'9 The legislature must select
the means "least restrictive" of speech to achieve its goal.so
However, the Supreme Court has formulated a somewhat more
accommodating test for governmental restrictions on commercial
speech. Under this "intermediate" level of scrutiny,'8' the Court first
considers whether the speech at issue "concern[s] lawful activity and
[is] not. . . misleading.""" If this condition is not met, the speech falls
outside the protection of the First Amendment.m However, if this
condition is satisfied, then the restriction on speech violates the First
Amendment unless (a) "the asserted governmental interest is
substantial,"" (b) "the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted,"" and (c) the regulation is "'narrowly drawn.""'
The Court has specified that the Government has the burden of
showing that the challenged regulation directly advances its interest
and that to meet this burden the government must show that its
regulation will advance this interest "'to a material degree."" The
Court also has stated "that if the Government could achieve its
interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts
less speech, the Government must do so.""
The Supreme Court has "characteriz[ed] the proposal of a
commercial transaction as 'the test for identifying commercial
speech."" 9 The Court has explained that speech is not "commercial
179. Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987) (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
180. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); accord Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
181. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted).




186. Id. at 565 (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,438 (1978).
187. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)).
188. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2001).
189. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (quoting
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989)); see also United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (noting that "commercial speech" is
"usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction").
Summer 20131 WORKPLACE SPEECH RIGHTS 713
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
speech" merely because it concerns a 'commercial subject.""" And
"the fact that [a speaker] has an economic motivation for [speaking
is] ... clearly ... insufficient by itself to turn the [speaker's speech]
into commercial speech."'.
The Supreme Court historically has given noncoercive speech
relating to labor relations greater protection than commercial speech.
As noted above, in 1940 the Supreme Court found that the First
Amendment's protections extended to "the dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute"'" and in 1945
affirmed that these protections extended to noncoercive attempts by
employers and employees "to persuade to action with respect to
joining or not joining unions."' By contrast, it was not until 1976
that the Supreme Court found that the First Amendment imposed
constraints on the government's freedom to restrict "a
communication which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction." 94
The Supreme Court provided its clearest indication of the
relative value of labor speech versus commercial speech under the
First Amendment in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council.'5 There, the Court
found that construing Section 8(b)(4)'s secondary boycott ban as
prohibiting peaceful and orderly handbilling, as the Board had, would
raise "serious constitutional issues."' In so finding, the Court
indicated that at least some labor speech was entitled to a greater
degree of protection under the First Amendment than commercial
speech:
We do not suggest that communications by labor
unions are never of the commercial speech variety and
thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional
protection. The handbills involved here, however, do
not appear to be typical commercial speech such as
advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits,
190. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 421 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)).
191. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp, 463 U.S. 60,67 (1983).
192. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 (1940).
193. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
194. Va. State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring).
195. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
196. Id. at 576.
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for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the
community and the dangers of inadequate wages to
the economy and the standard of living of the
populace."
A similar point can be made about an employer's discussions
with a labor organization, whether that labor organization is a trade
union or a nonunion employee involvement committee. A discussion
of wages can generate commentary regarding the value of employees'
work, the economic conditions within industry, the relationship
between employees' compensation and firm profitability, and
distributive equity. And a discussion of a grievance relating to
discipline or discharge can generate commentary regarding equality
of treatment, due process, and the proportionality of a penalty to an
offence. Such speech bears a greater resemblance to economic,
political and legal commentary than it does to typical commercial
speech.
Because commercial speech does not "retain[] its commercial
character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully
protected speech,"' Section 8(a)(2)'s restrictions on speech would
seem to be subject to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, it will be assumed
for the sake of argument that the intermediate level of scrutiny to
which the Supreme Court subjects restrictions on commercial speech
is the one that is applicable here. This path is chosen in the hope of
reaching a more decisive conclusion with respect to the First
Amendment issue, for there can be little doubt that a dialogue
between an employer and an employee group regarding terms and
conditions of employment merits at least as much protection under
the First Amendment as the typical commercial advertisement. As it
happens, the Board's Section 8(a)(2) restrictions cannot withstand
even this lesser level of scrutiny.
B. The Rationales for Section 8(a)(2)
1. The Puzzle of the Company Union Ban Revisited
As noted above, the legislative history of the Wagner Act leaves
no doubt that Congress' immediate objective in passing Section
8(a)(2) was to eliminate the company union. Why Congress deemed
this necessary or desirable, however, is more difficult to divine. The
197. Id.
198. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
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Act's prohibition of company unions cannot be explained (or
justified) merely by pointing to employers' and employees' supposed
adversarial relationship concerning terms and conditions of
employment and, hence, to the likelihood that any labor organization
that is dominated by an employer will be a less effective
representative of employees than one that is independently
established by employees. Even Senator Wagner appears to have
believed that employees were better off represented by a company
union than having no representation at all.1" If employees remain
free to choose trade unionism over company unionism, just as they
are free under the Act to choose trade unionism over nonunionism,
what harm is there in permitting employers to install company
unions?
Although several rationales for prohibiting company unions were
offered during the congressional hearings and debates on the 1934
Labor Disputes Bill and the 1935 National Labor Relations Bill
("Wagner bills"), a number of these cannot withstand even the most
cursory examination and, in any case, seem unlikely sources of
inspiration for the effort to seek a legislative ban on company unions
in the first place." However, two arguments for eliminating company
unions are not so easily dismissed. The first is that company unions
and the conduct engaged in by employers in establishing them coerce
employees. The second, the one favored by the early Board, is that
company unions deceive employees by providing the appearance, but
not the substance, of collective bargaining, thus leading employees to
forego trade unionization, contrary to their best interests.'" The
199. See Wagner, supra note 3 ("The company union has improved personal relations,
group-welfare activities, discipline, and the other matters which may be handled on a local
basis."), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 23.
200. The legislative history reveals a number of a priori rationales for Section 8(a)(2)
that postulate some supposed logical inconsistency in the notion of company unionism or
inherent incompatibility between company unionism and employee rights. For
descriptions of a number of these and why they afford inadequate defenses for Section
8(a)(2) under the First Amendment, see Lopatka, supra note 4, at 44-47. Perhaps the
most superficially plausible rationale for Section 8(a)(2) of this general sort "posits that
employees have a right not to be suppressed by the conflict of interest that exists when the
employer sets up or props up the party on the other side of the table." Id. at 47. For an
explanation as to why this justification for Section 8(a)(2) rises or falls on the strength of
the structural and performative dissemblance rationale, considered below, see id. at 47-54.
201. See, e.g., H. E. Fletcher Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 729, 736 (1938), enforced, 108 F.2d 459
(1st Cir. 1939); Int'l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348-51 (1936). In Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 990, 997 n.27 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994), the Board
appeared to endorse a combination of these two justifications for prohibiting company
unions, finding that "[m]uch of the harm implicit in employer-dominated organizations is
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underlying concern of both these not-mutually exclusive rationales
for Section 8(a)(2) is the retarding influence that company unions had
on the growth of trade union organization and arm's-length collective
bargaining.
Although the second of these rationales for Section 8(a)(2) posits
that company unions dupe employees into foregoing trade union
representation, the claim obviously is not-and could not tenably
be-that the individual communications that employers and
employees make in the course of their mutual dealings through a
company union are necessarily false or misleading. Thus, if
restrictions on this speech are to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny, then it must be shown, assuming that these communications
are commercial speech, that these restrictions "directly advance[]" a
"substantial" governmental interest and are "narrowly drawn" to
advance that interest.
2. The Coercion Rationale
a. Simple Coercion202
The Supreme Court has recognized that protecting employees'
freedom of choice with respect to joining or not joining unions is a
constitutionally sufficient reason for restricting coercive employer
speech. 20 And Senator Wagner and other congressional proponents
of the Wagner bills often justified these bills' restrictions on
employers' freedom to promote their own forms of employee
representation on the grounds of protecting employees' freedom of
choice from employer interference, although much of the conduct
they identified as interfering with employees' freedom of choice
would appear to fall outside the domain of employer behavior that
might be described as "coercive," as this concept has been explicated
by the Supreme Court.2 04
that, when they are successful, they appear to employees to be the result of an exercise of
statutory freedoms, when in fact they are coercive by their very nature."
202. 1 employ Mark Barenberg's terminology in naming the two variants of the
coercion rationale and the "structural and performative dissemblance" rationale discussed
below. See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 777, 804
(1994).
203. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
204. For instance, in its report to the House of Representatives on the National Labor
Relations Bill, the House Committee on Labor identified "financial support, participation
in the formulation of the constitution or bylaws or in the internal management of the
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Even so, there was no dearth of testimony about employer
behavior that unambiguously falls within that domain upon which
proponents of the Wagner bills might have relied in defending these
bills' prohibitions of company unions. In testifying before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor during its hearings on the
Wagner bills, labor leaders and others aligned with the American
trade union movement recited a litany of coercive tactics that
employers ostensibly brought to bear against employees in
connection with the establishment and operation of company unions,
including refusing to reinstate laid off employees who refused to sign
a card indicating their intention to join a company union;25 inducing
employees to belong to a company union by limiting group insurance,
death benefits and the right to file grievances to those who became
company union" as among "[t]he most commonly recognized forms of interference" with
employees' freedom of choice in connection with an employer's sponsorship of a company
union. H.R. REP. No. 74-1147, at 18 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note
3, at 3067. But why such conduct should interfere with employees' freedom to join a trade
union or engage in any of the other conduct protected by the Wagner Act is not
immediately obvious. The explanation for the Wagner Act proponents' seemingly
capacious concept of employer interference with employee free choice would appear to lie
in their view that nonunion employees were particularly susceptible to pressures exerted
by their employer owing to their vulnerability to employer retaliation within the
employment relationship. The reasoning appears to have been that by initiating,
financially supporting, or participating in the internal affairs of a labor organization, an
employer expressed its preference for that organization and that, because of employees'
fear of transgressing their employer's wishes, such expressions of preference by the
employer for the so-favored labor organization, by themselves, interfered with employees'
freedom to join other labor organizations. See id. (noting that these forms of employer
interference "are weighty precisely because of the existence of the employer-employee
relationship"); Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 96, at 131 (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison,
Dean, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., and first chairman of the pre-Wagner Act Board) ("The
company union cannot be set up in any form without it becoming perfectly apparent to all
of the employees that the employer is for this sort of thing. He is for it and he is friendly
to it, and it is perfectly apparent to the employees that they are expected to join it . . . .")
reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1511. This view is reflected in early
decisions by the Board in which the Board found that an employer interferes with its
employees' exercise of their rights under the Wagner Act by expressing its opposition to
trade union organization. See, e.g., Schult Trailers, 28 N.L.R.B. 975, 993-996 (1941); Ford
Motor Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 342, 350-52 (1940), enforced as modified, 122 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1941). However, the notion that an employer coerces its employees or otherwise
interferes with their free choice merely by indicating to them its support of or opposition
to trade unionism in general or any particular union has been rejected by the Supreme
Court. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617; Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537.
205. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 261 (statement of William Karlin, legal
adviser for the Int'l Jewelry Workers Union), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HiST., supra note
3, at 291.
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members of the company union;' informing employees with
perceived leadership capabilities that the company expected them to
help management form a company union;' instructing individual
employees to vote in an election of representatives under a company
union plan where the employee's participation in the election itself
was construed as indicating the employee's approval of the company
union plan;m and threatening employees who refused to join a
company union.'
However, even without Section 8(a)(2)'s ban on company
unions, Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) protect employees against the
kinds of coercive and discriminatory acts alleged by these witnesses.210
And as these protections, coupled with the Wagner Act's secret-
ballot-election machinery and other mechanisms, were thought
adequate to protect employees' choice of trade unionization over
nonunionization from employer coercion, they presumably are also
206. See id at 98 (statement of William Green, President, Am. Fed'n of Labor),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 128.
207. See id. at 144 (statement of John L. Lewis, President, United Mine Workers),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 174.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 135 (statement of Jacob Panken, trade union attorney), reprinted in 1
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 165.
210. Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006), provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in [Section 7 of the Wagner Act, as amended]." Section 7 of the
Wagner Act provided:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2006)). The Taft-Hartley Act added the following language to Section 7:
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2006)). Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006), provides in pertinent part that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization."
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adequate to protect employees' choice of trade unionization over
company unionization from employer coercion."' Congress did not
need to ban company unions in order to prevent employers from
coercing employees into forming or joining them or to prevent
employers from using these organizations as vehicles for interfering
with employees' right to form, join, or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing. Thus, protecting employees from such coercion
did not require the extensive restrictions on speech that flow from the
Board's historical application of Section 8(a)(2).
b. Structural Coercion
The "simple coercion" rationale for Section 8(a)(2) is inadequate
because Congress could have protected employees from this type of
coercion without prohibiting company unions. Mark Barenberg
suggests, however, that elements of coercion may have inhered in the
very structure of the company union. Specifically, Barenberg argues
that the Wagner Act Congress might plausibly have viewed the
"heightened status" and the "expanded opportunities for winning
employer favor or for skimming patronage"212 that service as an
employee representative conferred on an employee at the company-
unionized workplace as a coercive bribe to the employee to oppose
trade union organizational efforts, as the employee's enjoyment of
these benefits would continue only so long as these organizational
efforts were unsuccessful.213 Arguably, these incentives to oppose
trade unionism could not have been eliminated without eliminating
the underlying structure that gave rise to them.214
Before considering its underlying merits, some limitations of this
rationale for Section 8(a)(2) should be noted. For one, these
incentives would exist only where the employer-sponsored labor
organization is organized in a way that gives the employee
participants "heightened status or expanded opportunities for
winning employer favor or for skimming patronage." This seemingly
would exclude those labor organizations whose participants include a
substantial fraction of the workforce, such as an organization that
consists of a workforce organized along team lines that runs afoul of
211. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Worker Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1444 (1993).
212. Barenberg, supra note 202, at 782.
213. See id. at 782-85.
214. See id. at 782-83.
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Section 8(a)(2) because of an insufficient delegation of authority to
team members.
Yet another limit to this rationale is that these incentives are felt
only where there is a risk of organization by a trade union and there is
an expectation on the part of the employee representative of the
continued enjoyment of the benefits of his or her office if the
organizational drive by the trade union is unsuccessful. Where no
such expectation exists, either because the employer-sponsored labor
organization is designed to operate only for a brief period of time or
because the employee representatives are limited to single, short
terms of office, these incentives disappear.
However, even if Section 8(a)(2) only prohibited employee
involvement committees that were constructed along the lines of the
prominent pre-Wagner Act company unions-in which committee
members enjoy a certain level of status by virtue of their positions on
the committee and the prospect of continued tenures of office
following failed trade union organizing drives-this rationale for
Section 8(a)(2) would seem open to a number of objections. The first
concerns the notion that such incentives are coercive. Employees are
not coerced merely because their decision to support or not support a
trade union is influenced by conditions or expectations created by
their employer. Although an employer may coerce employees by
granting a wage or benefit increase during an organizing campaign for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of that campaign,
[tihe Board has long held that the granting of benefits
during an election campaign is not per se unlawful
where the employer can show that its actions were
governed by factors other than the pending election.
And the Board has further held that an employer can
meet this burden by showing that the benefits granted
were part of an already established company policy
and the employer did not deviate from that policy
upon the advent of the Union.215
Similarly, although an employer coerces employees if the employer
makes "'threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own
215. Am. Sunroof Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 748, 748 (1980), enforced as modified, 667 F.2d
20 (6th Cir. 1981).
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volition,"'2 16 the Supreme Court has found that it is not unlawful for
an employer to communicate "'what he reasonably believes will be
the likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his
control,"'." even though the making of such a prediction may deter
employees from choosing trade union representation as effectively as
the making of an unlawful threat.
What distinguishes the coercive grant of benefit from the
noncoercive grant of benefit and the unlawful threat from the lawful
prediction is the element of retaliatory animus. As the Supreme
Court has explained, the reason why a grant of a benefit that is
calculated to influence the outcome of a union representation
election is coercive is "the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet
glove."' That is, employees will comprehend that an employer that
grants benefits to deter trade union organization also may withdraw
them if the outcome of the trade union organizing campaign is not as
the employer desires.21 9 By contrast, no retaliatory message is implied
when an employer grants a wage or benefit increase that would have
been awarded in the absence of organizing activity.
Nor is there any intimation of employer retaliation when
employee representatives lose their emoluments of office at the
successful conclusion of a trade union's organizing drive. That is
merely a function of the mechanics of federal labor law, which gives
exclusive jurisdiction to the employees' lawful bargaining
representative, and conforms to the undoubted preferences of the
trade union. Absent the intimation of possible employer retaliation,
the incentives that a company union's employee representatives have
to campaign and vote against a trade union would seem to be no
different in kind than the incentives that stewards or other local
representatives of an incumbent trade union-persons who are
usually employed by an employer with whom the trade union has a
collective bargaining relationship220-have to campaign and vote for a
trade union when the majority support of that trade union is
challenged by a decertification petition. If, then, the latter incentives
are not coercive, why are the comparable incentives coercive when
experienced by representatives of a company union?
216. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (quoting NLRB v. River
Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2nd Cir. 1967)).
217. Id. (quoting River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d at 202).
218. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,409 (1964).
219. Id.
220. See Lopatka, supra note 4, at 64.
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Second, even assuming that employee representatives in a
company union are coerced by the threatened loss of their
emoluments of office, there are ways an employer can incentivize an
employee subgroup into opposing trade unionism without creating a
company union. For instance, an employer might use the resources it
would otherwise have expended on a company union on a variety of
so-called "[variable pay plans] such as profit sharing, employee stock
ownership plans, knowledge pay, merit pay, etc.,"221 likely to be
viewed by their beneficiaries as being put in jeopardy by the
organization of their plant by a national or international trade union,
a type of collective bargaining agent that is popularly associated with
an adversarial approach to collective bargaining and that is generally
averse to compensation schemes that allow for variations in
individual employees' pay based on management's assessments of
their performance or that link employees' compensation to firm
profitability.222  The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
government cannot establish that a restriction on speech directly
advances a substantial governmental interest on the basis of
"speculation or conjecture."22 3 Yet, given the availability to the
employer of these alternatives, it would seem to require nothing short
of that to conclude that prohibiting company unions advances the
government's interest in reducing employer-created incentives for
employees to oppose trade union organization to a "material degree."
Finally, the cost to employee free choice of prohibiting
employer-sponsored labor organizations seemingly has to be factored
in to an assessment as to whether Section 8(a)(2)'s burden on speech
is justified by the government's interest in eliminating structural
coercion. The government's interest in protecting employees from
coercion ultimately rests on its interest in protecting employees'
freedom of choice concerning workplace governance.22 4 But this
freedom of choice can be limited not only by employer coercion, but
221. Anil Verma, What Do Unions Do to the Workplace? Union Effects on
Management and HRM Policies, in WHAT Do UNIONS Do?: A TWENTY-YEAR
PERSPECTIVE 275,288 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007).
222. Ignace NG & Dennis Maki, Trade Union Influence on Human Resource
Management Practices, 33 INDUS. REL.: J. ECON. & SOCIETY 121, 131-32 (1994); Verma,
supra note 221, at 288-89.
223. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993); accord Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
224. See Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1961) (noting that the
purpose of the Wagner Act's and Taft-Hartley Act's prohibitions against coercion was "to
assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection of representatives").
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also by government edict.25 Given that the ostensibly coercive
influences eliminated by prohibiting employer-sponsored labor
organizations under this rationale bear on only a subgroup of
employees, i.e., the employee representatives, and, even then, merely
deter this subgroup from choosing to be represented by a trade union
and do not foreclose the possibility altogether, while the Board's
Section 8(a)(2) restrictions deprive all employees of the freedom to
choose what is arguably the most popular form of workplace
governance,226 it seems unlikely that a salutary effect of these
restrictions is a net expansion of employees' freedom of choice
regarding workplace governance.
3. The Structural and Performative Dissemblance Rationale
a. The Company Union as an Instrument of Deception
In an early resolution condemning company unions the
leadership of the American Federation of Labor alleged that
company unions were "a delusion and a snare set up by the
companies for the express purpose of deluding workers into the belief
that they have some protection and thus have no need for trade union
organization."2 " This charge was restated in various ways during the
225. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD; ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (offering
the examples of being legally prohibited from doing something and being physically
constrained from doing it as ways one can be unfree to do something and yet not be
coerced into not doing it).
226. A 1994 national telephone survey of more than 2,400 American workers ("Wave
1" of the "Worker Representation and Participation Survey") that was devised and
directed by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL
ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 2-4, 17, 31, 157 (1999), and that figured prominently in
the final report of the U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key-workplace/2/ (follow "The Dunlop
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations - Final Report" hyperlink),
revealed that a majority of non-managerial employees "feel more comfortable raising
workplace problems... [tjhrough an employee association" rather than "[a]s an
individual." FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra at 55, Exh. 3.7, 169. At the same time, non-
managerial employees surveyed indicated by a 85%-10% margin that they preferred an
organization "run jointly by employees and management" to one "run by employees
alone" and by a 52%-34% margin that they preferred an organization "draw[ing] on
company budget and staff' to one "rely[ing] on [its] own budget and staff." Id. at 142,
Exh. 7.1. Non-managerial employees surveyed who were not members of a union also
indicated by a 55%-32% margin that they would vote against a union if an election were
held at their company or organization. Id. at 69, Exh. 4.1.
227. Resolution No. 201, adopted by the convention as modified per the
recommendation of the Committee on Organization, in REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF
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congressional hearings and debates on the Wagner bills. In his
testimony before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
United Mine Workers President John L. Lewis alleged that company
unions were "mere makeshifts and hollow mockeries deceptive in
themselves and intended to divert the energies of the workers from
their own self-protection to the protection of the corporation which
employs them."2" For his part, Senator Wagner frequently alluded to
company unions as "sham," "dummy," or "spurious unions."22 9 He
also suggested that the reason company unions had "sprouted most
prolifically" after the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery
Act in 19332m was because employers wished to resist the trade union
organizational efforts encouraged by that act."
Unless it is to be supposed that Senator Wagner believed that
employers created these entities to no purpose, the inescapable
implication of his views was that employees were, in fact, sometimes
deceived by these entities' outward appearances. This notion,
implicit in Senator Wagner's remarks, was made explicit by a number
of witnesses in the hearings conducted on the Wagner bills by the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor. Lloyd Garrison, the pre-
Wagner Act Board's first chairman, contended that employees were
"rather lulled to sleep by the false activity of the company union,
which ha[d] an appearance of representing them and of acting for
them, but which [wa]s in fact quite incompetent and quite powerless
to do anything for them."m2 One witness likened the effect that
company unions sometimes had on workers to that of a puppet show
on its audience:
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(1919).
228. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 143 (statement of John L. Lewis, President,
United Mine Workers), reprinted in I NLRA LEG. HIST, supra note 3, at 173; see also id. at
456 (statement of Louis B. Ward, business counsel) (contending that company unions are
"delusions and snares"-mere "camouflage[d]" shells of genuine unions), reprinted in 1
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 490.
229. E.g., Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor,
74th Cong. 14 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra
note 3, at 2488; 79 CONG. REC. 2372 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in I
NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1313.
230. Pub. L. No. 73-90,48 Stat. 195 (1933).
231. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 96, at 40 (statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1416.
232. Id. at 131 (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison, Dean, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.),
reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1511.
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Now, these company unions are sometimes hard to
recognize. They are cleverly disguised. They are like
the puppet shows one sees in Italy, which so delight
the children by their illusion. They go through all the
motions, they swat one another over the head; but it is
all done by an unseen person behind the screens who
pulls the strings. It fools even some adults."'
As a consequence, according to this theory, employees remain
contented with company unions and unreceptive to organizing efforts
by trade unions even though trade union representation is in their
best interest.
Among the ways that company-unionized employers have been
alleged to have achieved this effect include draping company unions
with the trappings of industrial democracy, thereby giving employees
"the semblance," but not "the substance, of collective activity";234
endowing company unions with elaborate, albeit ultimately
ineffective grievance machineries;2' creating a false appearance of
activity by the company union by keeping its deliberations focused on
matters of minor importance rather than the more substantive issues
of wages and hours;"' funneling predetermined wage and benefit
increases through the company union apparatus, thus generating the
false impression that these increases were obtained because of the
company union;" eliminating the need for dues by covering the
expenses of the company union, leading employees to believe they
were getting the benefits of the company union for nothing "even
though the not inconsiderable costs of running the company union in
fact came out of labor and management's joint surplus";.3 . and giving
the company union an appearance of independence, while "subtly
233. Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 38, at 133 (statement of Charlton Ogburn,
general counsel, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. & Elec. Rys. Emps.), reprinted in 1 NLRA
LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 163.
234. H. E. Fletcher Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 729, 736 (1938), enforced, 108 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.
1939).
235. See Int'l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 348-49 (1936).
236. See Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 96, at 131 (statement of Lloyd K. Garrison,
Dean, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.), reprinted in 1 NLRA LEG. HIST., supra note 3, at 1511;
Resolution No. 201, supra note 227.
237. See Int'l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. at 331-33; Hearings on H.R. 6288, supra note
229, at 237 (statement of Edward Kephart, President, Buckeye Lodge, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, McDonald, Ohio), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEG.
HIST., supra note 3, at 2711.
238. Barenberg, supra note 202, at 805.
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orchestrat[ing] outcomes." 9  These practices would have been
difficult to eradicate without eliminating company unions altogether.
Explained in this fashion, Section 8(a)(2) is unabashedly
paternalistic. This is problematic for Section 8(a)(2), for, as discussed
below, paternalistic regulations of speech have generally not fared
well under the First Amendment. However, like the structural
coercion rationale for Section 8(a)(2), this rationale at least has the
merit of explaining why the Wagner Act Congress might have left
employees free to choose the nonunion, but not the company-union,
form of workplace governance.
b. Permissible and Impermissible Paternalism Under the First
Amendment
The Supreme Court has explicitly disapproved of paternalistic
restrictions on fully protected speech, a paternalistic restriction on
speech being defined here as a restriction on otherwise protected
speech that the government justifies on the basis of one or more of
the following reasons: (1) that engaging in that speech may not be in
the best interest of the speaker; (2) that receiving the message directly
or indirectly conveyed by that speech may not be in the best interests
of those receiving it; or (3) that the transmission or receipt of the
message conveyed by that speech by one or more members of an
organization, association or group may not be in the best interest of
the organization, association or group as a whole." For example, in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,' the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited business corporations from
making contributions or expenditures to influence the outcome of
voter referenda, other than those referenda affecting their property,
business or assets. The Court found that Massachusetts' asserted
interest in preventing corporations from having an undue influence
on such referenda was not a legitimate basis for restricting these
contributions and expenditures. The Court explained:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
239. Id.; see also J. Greenebaum Tanning Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 300, 311-13 (1939),
enforced as modified, 110 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1940).
240. Compare Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment,
37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 582-83 (2004) (defining a paternalistic restriction on speech
as "a restriction on otherwise protected speech justified by the government's belief that
speaking or receiving the information in the speech is not in citizens' own best interests").
241. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in
making their judgment, the source and credibility of
the advocate. But if there be any danger that the
people cannot evaluate the information and arguments
advanced by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by
the Framers of the First Amendment.242
The Court further declared: "Government is forbidden to assume the
task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern
themselves. The First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic'
approach of statutes like [the Massachusetts one] which restrict what
the people may hear." 43
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee2 44
and in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,
Inc.,2 45 the Supreme Court invalidated state laws that had as one of
their purposes the protection of speakers from harm. In San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, the Court struck
down a California election code law that, inter alia, "prohibit[ed] the
official governing bodies of political parties from endorsing
candidates in party primaries." 2" One of the grounds on which
California endeavored to justify its endorsement ban was that it
advanced the State's interest in "party stability" and, hence, its
interest in "stable government" by removing a source of intra-party
friction.47 However, the Court rejected this argument, finding that
"even if a ban on endorsements saves a political party from pursuing
self-destructive acts, that would not justify a State substituting its
judgment for that of the party."m
Likewise, in National Federation of the Blind, the Supreme Court
found that North Carolina's limitations on professional fundraiser
fees were not justified by the State's interest in protecting charities
from unfair fees. The Court pointedly asserted, "The First
Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the
242. Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted).
243. Id. at 791 n.31 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
244. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
245. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
246. 489 U.S. at 216.
247. Id. at 225-27.
248. Id. at 227-28.
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government, know best both what they want to say and how to say
it."249
The Supreme Court has been no less explicit in its condemnation
of paternalistic restrictions on commercial speech. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,2"o the
Court struck down a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug prices. The Court explained the
rationale for the ban as follows:
It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who
wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low quality,
services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up
on his offer by too many unwitting customers. They
will choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive
the "professional" pharmacist out of business. They
will respond only to costly and excessive advertising,
and end up paying the price. They will go from one
pharmacist to another, following the discount, and
destroy the pharmacist-customer relationship. They
will lose respect for the profession because it
advertises. All this is not in their best interests, and all
this can be avoided if they are not permitted to know
who is charging what."'
The Court rejected these justifications as incompatible with First
Amendment principles. The Court observed that the alternative
required by the First Amendment to the "highly paternalistic
approach" of banning advertising by low-cost pharmacists was to
allow the low-cost pharmacist to advertise her low prices and the
"'professional' pharmacist [to] market[] his own assertedly superior
product," and to assume "that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed."252
Likewise, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro,253 the Supreme Court found that a "far more basic"
constitutional defect with Willingboro's ban on home "For Sale" signs
than the fact that it had not been shown to directly advance the
249. 487 U.S. at 790-91.
250. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
251. Id. at 769-70.
252. Id. at 770.
253. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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township's interest in deterring panic selling was the fact that it was
designed by the Township Council "to restrict the free flow of
[information regarding home sales activity] because it fear[ed] that
otherwise homeowners w[ould] make decisions inimical to what the
Council view[ed] as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate
interest of the township: they w[ould] choose to leave town."'M The
Court found that in attempting to protect its residents in this way
Willingboro was guilty of the same "'highly paternalistic approach"'
that it had decried in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy."'
Similarly, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Supreme Court
found that the suspension of two attorneys, who transgressed an
Arizona State Supreme Court disciplinary rule by placing a
newspaper advertisement offering "legal services at very reasonable
fees" and listing their fees for certain routine services, violated the
First Amendment. One of the arguments that the Arizona Bar raised
on behalf of the rule's restrictions on attorney advertising was that
the "advertising of legal services [is] inevitably ... misleading ...
because advertising by attorneys will highlight irrelevant factors and
fail to show the relevant factor of skill."m' However, the Court
suspected that this argument rested on an underestimation of the
public's ability to appreciate advertising's limitations." "In any
event," the Court observed, "we view as dubious any justification that
is based on the benefits of public ignorance.""
Yet, despite the Supreme Court's condemnations of the
paternalistic regulation of speech, the Court has not disapproved of
all instances of governmental paternalism in this area. For instance,
the Court has found that the government may prohibit false or
misleading commercial advertising claims even though such
prohibitions ordinarily are intended to protect consumers from the ill-
influence these commercial messages have on them.2W And, along
these lines, the Court opined in Bates that "because the public lacks
sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be
254. Id. at 96.
255. Id. at 97 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
256. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
257. Id. at 372.
258. Id. at 374-75.
259. Id. at 375.
260. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
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overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be
found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."26 1
The Supreme Court also occasionally has sanctioned
paternalistic rationales for restricting truthful commercial speech. In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
the Court indicated that the State of New York could impose an
advertising ban in order to discourage energy consumption, but found
that the advertising ban at issue in that case impermissibly extended
to advertising that might not increase consumption;262 in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Court
found that a Puerto Rico ban on the advertising of casino gambling
directed at Puerto Rico residents was justified by Puerto Rico's
interest in discouraging casino gambling by its residents;.. in United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the Court found that an FCC ban on
the advertising of lottery tickets by broadcasters licensed to a state
that did not allow lotteries was justified by the government's interest
in supporting a state's anti-gambling policy;"" and, in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., the Court implicitly accepted the government's right to
prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels in order to
curb "strength wars" by beer brewers, who might seek to compete for
customers on the basis of alcohol content, but found that the
government's regulatory scheme was too irrational to advance its
asserted interest.265
Even political speech would not seem entirely immune to
paternalistic regulation under the First Amendment. The Supreme
261. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
262. See 447 U.S. 557, 568-70 (1980).
263. See 478 U.S. 328, 340-44 (1986). In Posadas, the Supreme Court found that it
was "up to the legislature to decide whether or not [an anti-gambling educational
campaign] would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a
restriction on advertising." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), a plurality of the Court took issue with this "highly deferential
approach" to a state legislature's decision "to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information for paternalistic purposes," finding it to be incompatible with the Court's
other prior cases on the subject. Id. at 510 (plurality opinion). However, unlike Justice
Thomas, see id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring), the plurality in 44 Liquormart, Inc. did not
suggest that a paternalistic restriction of the sort at issue in Posadas was inherently
illegitimate under the First Amendment, but only that the Posadas majority erred in not
requiring the government to show that its advertising restriction reduced consumers'
demand for casino gambling "'to a material degree,"' id. at 505 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)), and was "no more extensive than
necessary." Id. at 507.
264. See 509 U.S. 418,426-30 (1993).
265. See 514 U.S. 476,485-90 (1994).
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Court has indicated that "inciting . .. imminent lawless action" is not
protected by the First Amendment even though the incitement may
be accomplished through means of political speech." Arguably,
restrictions on such speech are not paternalistic because they can be
justified solely by reference to the interests of innocent third parties.
But it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would find that the
First Amendment requires the government to ignore the potential
harm that inciting imminent lawless action might cause to those
incited to engage in it.
All of which leads to the following question: Why are
paternalistic restrictions on speech generally, but not always,
invalid?2 67 And why are paternalistic restrictions on speech more
frequently tolerated when commercial speech is involved than when
political speech is? Is it because a paternalistic restriction on speech
more easily withstands intermediate than strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment? The Supreme Court's oft-invoked marketplace of
ideas metaphor points to a different explanation.
In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,'6 Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court in a 5-4 decision, noted that the notion that the First
Amendment grants "an unlimited license to talk" could not "be
reconciled with the law relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation,
obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity
by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like."2 69 In his view, the many
exceptions to such a license supported the notion that in divining
whether speech is protected under the First Amendment a court is
obliged to engage in "an appropriate weighing of the respective
interests involved" in permitting that speech and in suppressing it.270
A problem that has been noted with this "balancing" approach,
however, is that it is difficult to square with the facial command of the
First Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall pass no
266. Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
267. In 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 520-521 (Thomas, J., concurring), Justice
Thomas noted that the Supreme Court had not as of then explained how its seeming
acceptance in Central Hudson, Posadas, and other cases of "the legitimacy of laws that
suppress information in order to manipulate the choices of consumers" comports with the
many cases following Va. State Board of Pharmacy in which the Supreme Court
"stress[ed] ... the antipaternalistic premises of the First Amendment." The Court has not
offered an explanation since.
268. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
269. Id. at 49 n.10, 50.
270. Id. at 51.
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law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' For how is it permissible
for a court to balance free speech rights against other governmental
interests when the text of the First Amendment indicates that the
rights enumerated therein take precedence over any conflicting
governmental priorities?
An alternative way that has been suggested by which one might
attempt to account for the many exceptions to an unlimited license to
talk, while giving force to the First Amendment's absolutist language,
is by supposing that "the freedom of speech" protected by the First
Amendment encompasses something other than the freedom to
engage in any and all expression free from governmental interference
and then supposing that the First Amendment gives "absolute"
protection to whatever this other might be."2 Possible candidates that
have been proposed include the freedom to engage in a particular
kind of process," with the freedom to engage in a "marketplace of
ideas" being the best-known example of this kind of conception of the
First Amendment.
The marketplace of ideas refers to a process by which competing
ideas gain public acceptance. In his famous dissent in Abrams v.
United States,274 Justice Holmes likened the deliberative process
contemplated by the First Amendment to an economic free market in
which sellers of ideas compete with each other for the intellectual
allegiance of the public, it being the premise of the First Amendment
"that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which [the public's] wishes safely can be carried
out." 275
This notion, that the First Amendment leaves the task of
identifying the truth to the marketplace of ideas rather than the
271. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 17 (1948) ("The phrase, 'Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech,' is unqualified. It admits of no exceptions."); Laurent B. Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424,1447-1448 (1962).
272. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245,247-48 (1961).
273. See Frantz, supra note 271, at 1449 n.105 (defining 'the freedom of speech"'
protected by the First Amendment "as the exclusion of governmental force from the
process by which public opinion is formed on public issues"); Meiklejohn, supra note 272,
at 255 ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern."').
274. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
275. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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public authority, has become a bedrock part of our First Amendment
jurisprudence. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to
state that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail." 77
Implicit in the view "that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market" is the
belief "that the people are not foolish but intelligent, and will
separate the wheat from the chaff."278 It is for this reason that they
can be counted on to "perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed."279 And it is for this reason as well that
"'[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."'28
That the people are intelligent, that is, composed of individuals
who are, by and large, both "rational and skeptical" and "capable,
when left to their own devices, of sorting through masses of
information to discover truth,""' is an assumption that the
276. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821,
825 (2008) (noting that Justice Holmes' marketplace of ideas metaphor has "dominat[ed]
the explanation and the justification for free speech in the United States"); William P.
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1995) ("In Speech Clause jurisprudence . .. the oft-repeated metaphor that the
First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to ultimately prevail
over falsity has been virtually canonized."); Darrel C. Menthe, The Marketplace Metaphor
and Commercial Speech Doctrine: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying About and Love
Citizens United, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131,146 (2010) ("[T]he marketplace metaphor
with its neoconservative economic connotations is now dominant in the Court's First
Amendment decisions."). For partial lists of cases in which the Supreme Court has
invoked the marketplace of ideas metaphor for the First Amendment, see Blocher, supra
at 825 n.7; Menthe, supra at 144 n.62.
277. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added);
accord FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972).
278. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990) (Scalia J.,
dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
279. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
280, Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandies, J., concurring));
accord Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61
(1982).
281. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799,804 (2010).
marketplace of ideas model of the First Amendment shares with
democratic theory. As one commentator has put it:
The liberal democratic ideal reflected in the U.S.
Constitution imagines a rational citizenry, and the
First Amendment is part of the machinery to create
that citizenry. If citizens are incapable of exercising
their rational faculties to participate in public
discourse, then they are equally incapable of rational
self-governance. To reject the possibility of a rational
citizenry, therefore, is to reject the democratic ideal.m
From the perspective of our constitutional scheme, then, paternalistic
restrictions on speech are most objectionable when they presuppose
an incapacity on the part of the people to make the kinds of
judgments necessary for democratic self-governance.
If there is any theater of speech for which the marketplace of
ideas is an appropriate metaphor it would appear to be the arena of
electoral politics. The self-interest of office seekers and the persons,
factions and interests they represent; the controversial character of
the issues around which electoral politics revolve; and the
consequential nature of the outcomes of elections ensure that, absent
the intervention of government, the voting public will be exposed to a
wide range of conflicting views. It is the function of the citizenry
under our democratic form of government to weigh the merits of
these views. And it is considered a civic obligation of all citizens to
educate themselves on the issues of the day so that they can make
informed choices at the ballot box.
The majoritarian nature of our democratic processes of
government provides the public with a further layer of protection
from false or misleading speech by rendering harmless the gullibility
or ignorance of the few. Thus, our constitutional scheme does not
presuppose that people are universally wise or incapable of acting
from impulse, but merely that over time the people are the best judge
as to their best interests.
But not every paternalistic regulation of speech interferes with
the citizenry's assumption of its constitutionally assigned role to sit in
judgment of the truth of competing ideas. Some speech does not lend
itself to timely rebuttal, and some speech may cause harm to its
282. Id. at 839.
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hearers for reasons unrelated to any supposed inability on their part
to make reasoned judgments. The paternalistic regulations of speech
for which the Supreme Court has indicated approval regulated speech
of these sorts.
i. Restrictions on False or Misleading Commercial Speech
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,m the Supreme Court set forth a
dichotomous analytical framework for evaluating common law
restrictions on defamation that is equally applicable to the evaluation
of statutory restrictions on false or misleading speech. According to
the Court:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as
a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction... on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.28
However, the Court emphasized that false statements of fact
were not wholly outside the protections of the First Amendment. As
the Court explained, "the erroneous statement of fact is .. . inevitable
in free debate" and lest the threat of "punishment of error ...
induc[e] a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms of speech and press," it is necessary that "some
falsehood" be protected by the First Amendment "in order to protect
speech that matters.", 5
Even so, the Supreme Court has declined to extend First
Amendment protection to false or misleading commercial speech. In
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,m
the Court offered two reasons for this:
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge
of both the market and their products. Thus, they are
283. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
284. Id. at 339-40 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
(footnote omitted)).
285. Id. at 340-41.
286. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their
messages . . . . In addition, commercial speech, the
offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of
expression that is not "particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation.""
Under the Gertz framework, therefore, speech can never be
suppressed because it conveys a false idea. A false statement of fact
may be suppressed if the government's interest in averting the harm it
causes outweighs whatever contribution that permitting it makes to
"advanc[ing] society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate on public issues,"' with the balance of interests weighing on
the side of suppression when false or misleading commercial speech is
involved.
But the inferior status of false or misleading commercial speech
under the Constitution also can be explained by reference to the
marketplace of ideas metaphor. Unlike a factual claim regarding
"truth, science, morality and arts in general" or the "administration of
government,"' for which there exists a widely accepted common
body of knowledge against which such a claim can be compared, a
claim that a product is sold at a particular price or performs a
particular function generally concerns a matter that is within the
"specific and unique knowledge" of the commercial speaker.2" One
consequence of this is that other speakers will be less able to
challenge such a claim. Another consequence is that the individual
consumer will be less able to draw upon his or her own experiences
and knowledge to evaluate its truthfulness. It involves no denigration
of the intellectual abilities of consumers to acknowledge that they will
not always be in a position to know or to test out the truthfulness of
all the various advertising claims that they may encounter.
Moreover, even where a commercial speaker's competitors have
knowledge of the falsity of a commercial advertising claim, there
often will not be time to rebut the claim before harm is done. And
the majoritarian protections that are built into our democratic
287. Id. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
288. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (quoting letter from the
Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec (1774), reprinted in 1 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Supreme Court has found such speech to be worthy of the First Amendment's highest
protections. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976); Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
289. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Summer 2013] 737
processes are largely inapplicable in the commercial sphere, as the
harm that the government has an interest in averting occurs if any
single consumer relies on false or misleading commercial speech to
his or her detriment. Thus, even though restricting false or
misleading commercial speech is "paternalistic" in the broadest sense
of the term, it does not presume a deficiency in knowledge or
judgment on the part of the people that is inconsistent with the
presumptions of our democratic form of government.
ii. Restrictions on Truthful Commercial Speech
The paternalistic restrictions on truthful commercial speech that
the Supreme Court indicated were permissible or would have been
permissible but for the fact they were overbroad or failed to
materially advance the interest asserted by the government were
likewise not predicated on assumptions regarding the people at odds
with the assumptions underlying the marketplace of ideas metaphor.
There are only a few cases-and energy use, alcohol consumption,
and gambling are among them-where the government might be
thought to have a substantial interest in suppressing lawful economic
activity. Because the evil that the government seeks to avert in these
cases by restricting advertising is an increase in the public's
participation in the activity advertised, a marketplace of ideas
represents a satisfactory alternative means for averting the evil only if
it includes among its offerings speech aimed at discouraging the
public's participation in that activity. But such speech is unlikely to
arise from the private commercial marketplace. The usual persons to
provide corrective speech for commercial advertising-the economic
competitors of the company whose product or service is being
advertised-have little interest in "offer[ing] admonitory comments
on the safety or health characteristics or other risks or functional
costs of their competitor's offerings-with which their own products,
or offered services, often share so many characteristics."' And
290. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1153, 1167 (2012). Brudney argues that this is a reason for withholding First Amendment
protection from commercial speech in most instances. See id. at 1154, 1217-19, 1223.
However, even if commercial speech was, for this reason, a wholly proscribable class of
speech under the First Amendment, this would not necessarily authorize the government
to make content-based distinctions within this class of speech--e.g., permitting
pharmacists to advertise the advantages of taking prescription drugs, but not the
pharmacists' prices for them-where it is reasonable to anticipate that the needed
corrective information would be furnished by the commercial speaker's competitors. See
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (ordinance that made content-based
distinctions between different kinds of fighting words violated the First Amendment).
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vendors in industries other than the one whose economic activity the
government seeks to suppress ordinarily would have too weak an
economic interest in discouraging consumers' participation in the
disfavored activity to make the cost of engaging in such corrective
speech worthwhile.
Moreover, the restrictions in Central Hudson, Posadas, Edge
Broadcasting and Coors Brewing Co. were designed to suppress
speech relating to the satisfaction of some want for which little
intervening calculation on the part of the consumer was required.
People tend not to increase their energy use, gamble, or drink higher
proof beer because they are persuaded of the intellectual merits of
doing so, but rather because such activities serve some immediate
gratification. A person's proclivity to consume alcohol is not
necessarily predictive of that person's views as to the merits (medical
or otherwise) of consuming alcohol or views as to the societal interest
in discouraging alcohol consumption. Thus, although these
restrictions were designed to influence behavior, they did not do so
through the medium of influencing public opinion and were not
predicated on the assumption that the legislature had greater
knowledge or powers of ratiocination than consumers.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the legislative
judgments underlying the restrictions were relatively uncontroversial.
While there have been a number of public policy controversies
concerning energy consumption, casino gambling, lotteries, and
alcohol, there are not sizeable constituencies for the propositions that
the public would be better off if there were an increased predilection
on the part of consumers to consume energy (Central Hudson),
engage in casino gambling (Posadas), participate in lotteries in those
states that prohibit them (Edge Broadcasting), or drink higher proof
beer (Coors Brewing Co.). Although, from one perspective, the
degree of controversy surrounding a proposition is a highly
unsatisfactory method of determining whether expression is protected
by the First Amendment, as unpopular views are those most in need
of constitutional protection, the relative absence of controversy on
these issues supports the notion that in adopting these restrictions the
legislature wasn't attempting to substitute its judgment for the
reasoned judgments of consumers.
By contrast, there was considerable controversy in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy as to soundness of the principal underlying
rationale for the advertising ban: that consumers would be better off
avoiding low cost pharmaceutical services and products. Indicative of
the controversial nature of this assumption was the fact that the
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plaintiffs in the case included a consumer organization that had
approximately 150,000 members and the Virginia State AFL-CIO."'
iii. Section 8(a)(2)
The above considerations suggest that there is no simple bright
line test to determine the validity of a paternalistic restriction on
speech. However, if the degree to which a paternalistic restriction on
speech interferes with the formation or operation of a marketplace of
ideas is the decisive factor in determining whether such a restriction
passes constitutional scrutiny, then the various paternalistic
restrictions on speech that a legislature might enact can be placed on
a continuum, bounded on one side by paternalistic restrictions on
political advocacy, which are rarely permissible because they restrain
speech in contexts in which the protections of the marketplace of
ideas generally inhere, and on the other side by paternalistic
restrictions on false or misleading commercial speech, which suppress
speech in contexts in which all or most of the corrective features that
inhere in the political marketplace are absent. As the restrictions on
speech that the Board imposes pursuant to Section 8(a)(2) operate in
a context that bears virtually all of the features that render political
speech largely immune to paternalistic regulation, they would appear
to fall on the far end of the impermissible side of this continuum.
First, the divination of the truth or falsity of the message ostensibly
conveyed by the communications suppressed by Section 8(a)(2)-that
representation by an employer-sponsored labor organization is a
satisfactory substitute for representation by a trade union-depends
upon the divination of the truth or falsity of a series of psychological,
economic, sociological and political inferences and assumptions.
Whether or not this proposition is ultimately false, it is hardly
reducible to a simple factual assertion whose falsity is subject to
unambiguous ascertainment. Rather, if the message ostensibly
conveyed by the communications suppressed by the Board's Section
8(a)(2) restrictions is objectionable, it is because it conveys a "false
idea," for whose correction the First Amendment requires that "we
depend ... on the competition of other ideas.""
Second, the proposition that employees are better off
represented by a trade union than by an employer-sponsored labor
organization is a controversial one. The controversial nature of this
291. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753 & n.10.
292. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
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assertion among employees is illustrated by the Worker
Representation and Participation Survey ("WRPS"), which, as noted
above, revealed that large majorities of workers prefer joint
employee-management committees to unions, prefer an organization
"run jointly" by employees and management to one "run by
employees alone," and prefer "an organization drawing on company
budget and staff" to one "rely[ing] on [its] own budget and staff" for
dealing with their employer regarding workplace problems.'9 It also
is indicated by the fact that, during the 30-year period from the
Board's fiscal year 1969 through the Board's fiscal year 1998, trade
unions lost a majority of the representation elections conducted by
the Board,2 94 even though the principal alternative that employees had
for dealing with their employer regarding terms and conditions of
employment during this time was to do so on an individual basis, a
mode of dealing with management that the WRPS indicates is less
favored among employees than the employer-assisted employee
organization.295
Third, whether the message that is ostensibly conveyed by the
communications suppressed by the Board's Section 8(a)(2)
restrictions is truthful is not something within the unique knowledge
of the parties conveying it. Generally speaking, employees
represented by an employer-sponsored labor organization will know
as well as anyone whether their interests are being adequately served.
If our constitutional scheme presupposes that employees, like other
citizens, are capable of making informed choices about who should
represent them in Congress, it is difficult to see why it would not also
presuppose that employees are capable of making informed choices
about who should represent them in labor-management dealings
regarding their terms and conditions of employment-"subjects that
lie at the core of an employee's day-to-day concerns." 96
Fourth, information that might disabuse employees of any
misapprehension they may have regarding the need for trade union
representation as a result of an employer's dealings with an employer-
sponsored labor organization is typically available. Trade unions
"have every incentive to apprise employees of the defects and
disadvantages they perceive in employer-sponsored committees, for
293. See supra note 226.
294. See 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART B: WORK AND
WELFARE 2-352 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006).
295. See supra note 226.
296. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 63-64.
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they are in the business of convincing employees that there is no
substitute for traditional unionism." 297
There also are no exigencies of time that prevent this corrective
information from becoming available. The timing and duration of a
trade union's organizing campaign and the timing of the filing of a
representation petition that sets the Board's process for a Board-
supervised representation election in motion are almost entirely
controlled by the trade union. Thereafter, armed with employees'
home contact information, trade union organizers typically have an
additional five to six weeks to communicate with employees
regarding the advantages of being represented by a trade union."
Finally, the Wagner Act, as amended, provides for majority rule
in the selection of a bargaining representative." Consequently, it
provides the same majoritarian protections against the ignorance or
gullibility of the few that our political processes provide in the realm
of political speech.
Thus, the government's interest in preventing employees from
"erroneously" choosing employer-sponsored labor organizations over
trade unions is not legitimate.' This kind of paternalism is at odds
with the First Amendment's underlying presumption that the people
are intelligent and are capable of "perceiv[ing] their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed."'
In sum, none of the proffered rationales for Section 8(a)(2)
justify the burden on speech that flows from the Board's longstanding
interpretation of it. If, then, this central provision of the Wagner Act
is to be saved from First Amendment infirmity, the Board's historical
construction of it must be substantially revised.
297. Id. at 64-65.
298. See Gen. Counsel Memorandum No. 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting NLRB
Gen. Counsel, to All Employees, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Summary of Operations
(Fiscal Year 2010) 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/summary-operations
(follow "FY 2010 Summary" hyperlink) (noting that the median time to proceed to an
election from the filing of a petition was 38 days in fiscal year 2010 and 37 days in fiscal
year 2009).
299. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
300. Consequently, it is not necessary to consider whether Section 8(a)(2), as applied
by the Board, directly advances that interest or is narrowly drawn or whether, but for the
defect of paternalism, the government's interest in protecting employees from being
misled by employer-sponsored labor organizations is substantial.
301. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
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IV. The Coercion Standard
Because Cabot Carbon Co. placed much of the conduct
proscribed by Section 8(a)(2) outside the protection of the First
Amendment, neither the Board nor the courts have needed to
articulate what a constitutionally sound construction of Section
8(a)(2) might look like in light of the Supreme Court's more recent
First Amendment precedent. However, the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.3m suggests what this might be.
There, the Court identified the coerciveness of an employer's
expression of "his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union"303 as the yardstick for determining
whether that commentary is protected by the First Amendment.0 If
protecting employees from employer coercion is a sufficient basis for
restricting an employer's freedom to engage in such speech, then it
would seem reasonable to assume that it is also a sufficient basis for
restricting an employer's freedom to facilitate discussions with an
employee group concerning terms and conditions of employment.
How Section 8(a)(2) might be applied under such a construction
is open to debate. Lopatka contends that "[a]n employer-sponsored
employee committee that deals with management concerning terms
and conditions of employment only rarely will be coercive, if that
term retains its traditional meaning as intimidating or impeding
employees in exercising their free choice as to whether to be
represented by an independent labor organization."'' Even so, he
concedes that a coercion finding might be justified if
an employer foists an employee participation program
on employees in order to defeat a union organizing
campaign; compels involuntary employee
participation; ... signs a collective bargaining
agreement with an employer-sponsored committee
and leads employees to believe that there is a
contractual bar to a representation election or that
they have contractually waived their right to strike; ...
uses threats or intimidation to compel their adherence
to an employer-sponsored entity over competing
302. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
303. Id. at 618.
304. See id. at 617-18, 620.
305. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 87.
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independent unions; ... [or] takes control of or,
without regard to the wishes of employees, interferes
with the administration of an employee organization
independently established by employees, even in the
absence of overt threats or intimidation."
This list would seem to cover the principal ways an employer
might coerce employees in connection with an employee involvement
program, provided it is understood that the ways that an employer
might coerce employees into participating in such a program can be
more subtle than the ways that an employer might coerce employees
into voting against a trade union in a union representation election.
In Gissel Packing Co., the Supreme Court specified that any
assessment of the effect that an employer's communications has on
employees "must take into account the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the
former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more
disinterested ear."" This concern would seem to be particularly
acute in the case of an employer's appeal to employees to participate
in an employee involvement program because of the overt nature of
the conduct requested. Thus, in protecting employees' Section 7 right
to refrain from joining a labor organization, the Board probably
would be within the bounds prescribed by the First Amendment in
imposing greater restrictions on the ways an employer might
encourage employees to serve on an employee involvement
committee that falls within the statutory definition of a labor
organization than on the ways an employer might urge employees to
vote against a trade union in a secret ballot election. Likewise, the
Board probably would be warranted in requiring an employer, as a
condition of forming such a committee, to issue some pro forma
statement to employees that serving on the committee is voluntary
and that the employer will not retaliate against an employee because
he or she declines to do so and, subsequently, to require the employer
to adhere to these avowals.
But it would go too far to say that an employee's participation in
a nonunion employee involvement program is invariably coerced.
And the First Amendment does not tolerate a "prophylactic" ban on
commercial speech, let alone fully protected speech, where there
306. Id. at 87-88 (punctuation altered).
307. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617.
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exists "the possibility of policing [such speech] on a case-by-case
basis."
V. Interpreting Secton 8(a)(2) to Avoid
Constitutional Difficulties
It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that statutes
susceptible of more than one interpretation should be interpreted in a
way that avoids serious constitutional questions." In Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction
Trades Council,"'0 the Supreme Court explained:
[Wlhere an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress . . . . "[T]he elementary rule
is that every reasonable construction must be resorted
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.""'
Congressional professions of interest in preventing employers
from interfering with employees' freedom of choice notwithstanding,
there is ample evidence from the legislative history of the Wagner
Act that Congress did not mean to leave room for employers to
promote their own form of employee representation provided they
refrained from threatening employees or engaging in other conduct
that the Supreme Court has found to be coercive of employees.
Were, then, the Wagner Act to represent Congress' last word on the
subject of employer-employee communications, it is doubtful that
Section 8(a)(2) could reasonably be construed as prohibiting only
coercive employer behavior.
However, the Wagner Act was followed twelve years later by the
Taft-Hartley Act. This subsequent act "ushered in a period of
marked change in the government's attitude toward unionization.""'
But more importantly for our purposes here, it manifested a change
308. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985).
309. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979); Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,749 (1961).
310. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
311. Id. at 575 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,657 (1895)).
312. ARCHIBALD Cox, DEREK CURTIS BOK & ROBERT R. GORMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 86 (9th ed. 1981).
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in congressional policy with regard to labor-management
communication. This change was partly reflected in the amendment
to Section 9(a) upon which the employers relied in Cabot Carbon Co.
But it was primarily reflected in the adoption of a "free speech"
provision in Section 8(c). Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
any dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice. . ., if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit."'
One need not strain the language of this Section to construe it as
requiring the Board to find that an employer's conduct has coerced
employees before finding that conduct to be unlawful under Section
8(a)(2). First, by providing that "[tihe expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion... shall not constitute... an unfair labor
practice,"314 Section 8(c) establishes an affirmative right to engage in
the noncoercive expression of "views, argument, or opinion." In
doing so, it does not distinguish between the expression of views,
argument, or opinion that occurs in a speech and the expression of
views, argument, or opinion that occurs in a dialogue. And just as the
Supreme Court has found that the right of free speech under the First
Amendment implies a corresponding right to engage in conduct
needed to effectuate it, e.g., the hiring of a hall or the expenditure of
money for printing, paper, and circulation costs, so too the right of
free speech under Section 8(c), which the Supreme Court has found
"merely implements the First Amendment,"' implies a
corresponding right to engage in conduct reasonably necessary to
facilitate that right.
Moreover, by providing that "[t]he expressing of any views
argument or opinion ... shall not ... be evidence of an unfair labor
313. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006). The phrase "promise of benefit" here refers to
promises that are unlawful under Section 8(a)(1). NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 617 (1969). And a promise is unlawful under Section 8(a)(1) only if it is made for the
purpose of "interferfing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in [Section 7 of the Wagner Act, as amended]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(2006).
314. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
315. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617.
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practice," Section 8(c) provides textual support for supposing that
such ancillary conduct as is needed to effectuate the right to engage in
noncoercive expression falls within its protections. If one assumes
that evidentiary immunity to unfair labor practice liability under this
section extends only to that expression that is willingly engaged in by
the speakers-a reasonable assumption, as it is to protect a speaker's
right of free speech that this evidentiary immunity is granted-then
Section 8(c) provides a statutory basis for the constitutionally
permissible construction of the Wagner Act, as amended, proposed
here."'
The biggest drawback to this interpretation of Section 8(c) is that
it appears to effect a more significant change in the treatment of
company unions than Congress contemplated when it passed the
Taft-Hartley Act. In reaffirming the Board's historical proscriptions
of company unionism in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,3" the Supreme
Court pointed to the fact that the conference bill-the bill that
emerged out of the House and Senate managers' conference on the
House and Senate bills and that was enacted into law after Congress
overrode President Truman's veto of it-omitted a provision in the
House bill that would have permitted an employer to "'[f]orm[] or
maintain[] ... a committee of employees and [to] discuss[] with it
matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of
employment, and other working conditions, if the Board has not
316. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
317. If an employer coerces employees in connection with a nonunion employee
involvement committee that falls within the statutory definition of a labor organization, it
is more likely because the employer has coerced the employees into serving on the
committee than because of anything that the employer might say to them during
committee meetings. To enable the Board to prohibit an employer from coercing
employees into serving on such a committee in those cases where the employer's
communications with the committee do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit, it is necessary to limit evidentiary immunity under Section 8(c) to that exchange
of views, argument, or opinion that is engaged in voluntarily by the participants. This
involves no more a departure from the letter of Section 8(c) than some of the common
sense exceptions that the Board already makes to Section 8(c)'s textual command. For
example, the Board has not the slightest compunction about considering evidence that an
employee expressed support for a union in determining whether his employer discharged
him for engaging in protected activity. See, e.g., Shearer's Foods, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 1093,
1093 (2003); La Gloria Oil and Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1120 (2002). Yet, read
literally, Section 8(c) prohibits the Board from doing so unless the employee's expression
contained a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The rationale for departing
from the letter of Section 8(c) in both cases is the same: in neither case does the Board's
use of such evidence chill the exercise of the right of free speech under the First
Amendment.
318. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
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certified or the employer has not [lawfully] recognized a
representative as their representative . . . .'"'9 The Court also cited
the fact that, in written remarks on this same conference bill, Senator
Robert Taft, the Taft-Hartley Act's principal sponsor in the Senate,
observed that it did not "'amend ... the provisions in subsection 8(2)
[of the Wagner Act] relating to company-dominated unions' and had
left its prohibitions 'unchanged."'32 0 These indicia of congressional
intent are difficult to reconcile with the supposition that the Taft-
Hartley Act substantially altered federal labor law's posture toward
employer-sponsored labor organizations.
Lopatka argues that as the Supreme Court has found that
"Section 8(c) 'merely implements the First Amendment' ... Section
8(c) should capture the First Amendment's protections as they evolve
over time.""' So understood, Section 8(c) operates as something of a
First Amendment savings clause. Thus, the argument would be that
Senator Taft and other congressional proponents of the Taft-Hartley
Act fully intended that Section 8(c) incorporate the First
Amendment's protections of speech as these might later be divined
by the Supreme Court and that Senator Taft's written comments on
the conference bill merely reflect the fact that he did not anticipate
what these might be.
The problem with this argument is that the House and Senate
conferees who produced the final bill rejected the free speech
provision in the Senate bill, which expressly incorporated the First
Amendment's protections, in favor of what was thought to be more
speech-protective language from the House bill.322 The reason for
319. Id. at 215 (quoting H.R. 3020, 80 Cong. § 8(d)(3) (1947) (as passed by House,
April 18, 1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 183 (1948) [hereinafter LMRA LEG. HIST.J).
320. Id. at 217 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 6600 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted
in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1539). On the other hand, in the same written
submission, Senator Taft noted that the purpose of "the phrase 'constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice"' in Section 8(c) was "to make it clear that the Board is not to
use any utterances containing [neither] threats [n]or promises of benefit as either an unfair
labor practice standing alone or as making some act which would otherwise not be an
unfair labor practice, an unfair labor practice." 93 CONG. REC. 6601 (1947) (statement of
Sen. Taft) (emphasis added), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1541.
Of course, that is precisely what the Board does when it conditions the attachment of
unfair labor practice liability to an employer's acts of dominating, interfering with or
supporting an employee involvement committee on the basis of the subject matter of the
employer's discussions with the committee.
321. Lopatka, supra note 4, at 84 (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
617 (1969)).
322. Section 8(c) of the Senate bill provided:
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:4748
this, according to Senator Taft, was to "freezef" the "rule" laid down
by the Supreme Court-i.e., that noncoercive speech is protected by
the First Amendment and, therefore, cannot be deemed to be an
unfair labor practice-"into the law itself, rather than.. . leave
employers dependent upon future decisions."0" Thus, if Section
8(a)(2) is to be saved from First Amendment infirmity in the manner
that Lopatka suggests, the following seemingly ad hoc explanation of
congressional intent would have to be given: that Congress intended
that Section 8(c) capture the First Amendment's evolving protections
when they expand, but not when they contract, or at least not to the
point that they leave noncoercive speech outside their umbrella.
An alternative argument is that the legislative history cited by
the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon Co. bears only on the House and
Senate conferees' predilections regarding substantive changes to
Section 8(a)(2), not changes to evidentiary practices wrought by
Section 8(c) that might affect Section 8(a)(2)'s enforcement. Unlike
The Board shall not base any finding of unfair labor practice upon any
statement of views or arguments, either written or oral, if such
statement contains under all the circumstances no threat, express or
implied, of reprisal or force, or offer, express or implied, of benefit:
Provided, That no language or provision of this section [Section 8] is
intended to nor shall it be construed or administered so as to abridge
or interfere with the right of either employers or employees to
freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 8(c) (as passed by Senate, May 13, 1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA
LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 242. Meanwhile, Section 8(d) of the House bill provided in
pertinent part:
[8](d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section [Section 8],
the following shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act: (1) Expressing any
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, if it does not by its own terms
threaten force or economic reprisal.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. § 8(d) (as passed by House, April 18, 1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA
LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 183.
323. 93 CONG. REC. 3953 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG.
HIST., supra note 319, at 1011. Although Senator Taft does not specify, he presumably
refers here to the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
537-38 (1945). See S. REP. No. 80-105, at 23 (1947) (noting that one of the purposes of
Section 8(c) of the Senate bill was to correct what the committee deemed to be the
Board's overly restrictive construction of the Supreme Court's decision in Thomas),
reprinted in 1 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 429.
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the Wagner Act, which was enacted into law largely as Senator
Wagner had introduced it in February 1935, the Taft-Hartley Act was
an amalgam of two distinct bills-the House bill, the more radical of
the two, and the Senate bill-with distinct approaches to labor-
management communication. Although in Cabot Carbon Co. the
Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that the conference bill did not
contain Section 8(d)(3) of the House bill or any similar language, the
Court did not address the possible significance of the fact that the
conferees adopted a free speech provision that more closely followed
the version contained in Section 8(d)(1) of the House bill rather than
the one in Section 8(c) of the Senate bill. Because the House free
speech provision, or any close approximation thereto, did not appear
without Section 8(d)(3)'s amendment to Section 8(a)(2) of the
Wagner Act until late in the legislative process, Congress had little
opportunity to consider what impact the House free speech language
might have on an unamended Section 8(a)(2).
Section 8(c) of the conference bill was assailed during the
congressional debates for going beyond the protection of the
constitutional right of free speech and depriving the Board of the use
of evidence that would ordinarily be deemed relevant by a court of
law.324 Of particular note here are Senator Morse's arguments with
respect to Section 8(c)'s impact on the Board's ability to enforce
some of the Wagner Act's central injunctions against company
unionism:
One of the most objectionable and destructive
provisions in the bill is the free-speech amendment
made in conference....
. . . [Under this provision, i]f an employee were
discharged for union activities . .. the Board could not
use as evidence of the employer's purpose, any
expressions which were not in themselves coercive, no
matter how revealing they might be of the employer's
true reasons for the discharge. Under this provision,
too, an employer could urge his employees to form a
union, could suggest a constitution and bylaws, could
324. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 6673 (1947) (statement of Sen. Pepper), reprinted in 2
LMRA LEG. HIsT., supra note 319, at 1590-91; id. at 6656 (statement of Sen. Murray),
reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1567; id. at 6542 (statement of Cong.
Madden), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 887.
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recommend an attorney, and could propose who the
leaders of the organization should be, and he,
nevertheless, would be immune from charges of unfair
labor practices for forming and instigating what clearly
would be a company union in every sense. This is so
because, by the clear language of section 8(c) of the
bill, the employer's views or arguments shall not be
evidence of an unfair labor practice.
I think we would be far more honest and candid with
American labor, and fairer to it, too, if we repealed the
act instead of adopting an amendment such as this."'
Senator Taft seemed to concede that Section 8(c) might impede
the Board's enforcement of certain sections of the Wagner Act that
Congress had no intention of repealing, but appeared to take the view
that this was the price that had to be paid to ensure that an
employer's right of free speech was protected under the Act. In an
exchange with Senator Taft, Senator Pepper asked:
Under that provision [Section 8(c)], if an employer
were to say on Monday, "I hate labor unions, and I
think they are a menace to this country," and if he
fired a man on Thursday and the question was whether
that man was fired for cause or fired because he was
agitating for a union in the plant, would the statement
made on Monday, in which the man said, "I think
labor unions are a menace to this country" be
admissible in evidence as bearing on the question of
the reason for the discharge?32 6
Conceding that "[u]nder the facts generally stated by the Senator" the
statement would not be,32 7 Senator Taft justified this result as follows:
325. Id. at 6610 (statement of Sen. Morse), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra
note 319, at 1555.
326. Id. at 6603-04 (1947) (statement of Sen. Pepper), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG.
HIST., supra note 319, at 1545.
327. Id. at 6604 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note
319, at 1545.
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So long as the Board has a statement of that kind the
employer's mouth is practically shut. In case he makes
a speech later on and is charged with some unfair or
unlawful labor practice, and that can be considered in
evidence, it means that he cannot afford to speak at
all. Without that provision there is not freedom of
speech.3 ,
Congress, of course, was aware of the objection that Section 8(c)
would make it more difficult for the Board to enforce the unfair labor
practice provisions of the Wagner Act. That argument was made
repeatedly in the congressional debates329 and was raised again by
President Truman in his veto message.3 O Nevertheless, Congress
chose to retain that provision without modification in the face of
those objections. Thus, by refraining from amending Section 8(a)(2),
Congress did not necessarily signal its position on how Section 8(c)
should affect the Board's enforcement of Section 8(a)(2). Congress
evinced no intent to repeal the Wagner Act's proscriptions of
employer discrimination against employees for engaging in activity
protected by Section 7; yet both proponents and opponents of Section
8(c), alike, seemed to agree that Section 8(c) would hamper the
Board's ability to enforce those proscriptions."'
328. Id. (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at
1546.
329. See, e.g., id. at 6673-74 (statement of Sen. Pepper), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG.
HIST., supra note 319, at 1590-91; id. at 6655 (statement of Sen. Murray), reprinted in 2
LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1567; id. at 6542 (statement of Cong. Madden),
reprinted in I LMRA LEG. HIST, supra note 319, at 887.
330. See PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947-VETO MESSAGE, H.R. Doc. No. 80-334, at IV.5.(5) (1947), reprinted in 93 CONG.
REC. 7502 (1947) and in 1 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 918.
331. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 6673-74 (1947) (statement of Sen. Pepper), reprinted in
2 LMRA LEG. HIsT., supra note 319, at 1590-91; id. at 6610 (statement of Sen. Morse),
reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1555; id at 6604 (statement of Sen.
Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 1545-46. Even if one assumes
that by omitting Section 8(d)(3) of the House bill from the conference bill, the conferees
manifested an affirmative intention that the conference bill should not be construed as
permitting what Section 8(d)(3) would have allowed, the proposed construction of the
conference bill is not necessarily inconsistent with that intent. There is a difference
between permitting an employer to form or maintain nonunion employee involvement
committees that address terms and conditions of employment, provided the employer does
not coerce employees through such conduct, and permitting an employer,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of [Section 8]" to "[f]orm[] or maintain[] . . . a
committee of employees and [to] discuss[] with it matters of mutual interest, including
grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions, if the Board has
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Ultimately, it appears that Congress did not have a clear
understanding as to how Section 8(c) would affect the Board's
enforcement of Section 8(a)(2). Ordinarily, such legislative
uncertainty would afford a slim reed upon which to hang a claim that
a statutory provision brings about a substantial change in the law. In
the case of Section 8(c), however, Congress appears to have made a
conscious leap in the dark. That is to say, because the principles set
forth in Section 8(c) were so unobjectionable in themselves, Congress
was prepared to endorse the consequences of those principles, come
what may.
If this is a plausible account of Congress' intentions, then the
proposed construction of Section 8(c) would appear to be a
permissible one under the rule of statutory interpretation relied upon
by the Supreme Court in DeBartolo Corp. Congress clearly intended
that the protections afforded by Section 8(c) would be at least as
great as those provided by the First Amendment and devised a
statutory protection of speech that, when interpreted in a more literal
manner than the Board has heretofore favored, achieves that
purpose. Had Congress adopted what were thought to be the weaker
protections of speech in Section 8(c) of the Senate Bill, including that
section's express incorporation of the protections of the First
Amendment, there would be no question that the Wagner Act, as so
amended, would be susceptible to a construction consistent with the
First Amendment even though that construction might not have been
anticipated by the bill's supporters. Similarly, if, because of an
attachment to the principles set forth in Section 8(c), congressional
proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act resisted efforts to amend it
notwithstanding their conscious uncertainty as to its full ramifications,
then the fact they did not anticipate the construction of Section 8(c)
proposed here would not necessarily render that construction
contrary to congressional intent.
Conclusion
In sum, the Board's historical application of Section 8(a)(2)
violates the First Amendment. This defect can be corrected if the
not certified or the employer has not (lawfully] recognized a representative as their
representative . . . ." H.R. 3020, 80 Cong. § 8(d)(3) (1947) (as passed by House, April 18,
1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA LEG. HIST., supra note 319, at 183. The conferees would have
had reason for concern that such statutory language might permit an employer to compel
employees' participation on such a committee, to form such a committee in response to a
trade union's organizing campaign, and to engage in other coercive conduct prohibited
under the proposed construction of the conference bill.
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Board requires proof that an employer's initiation, administration or
support of any employee involvement program through which
management and employees discuss workplace issues has coerced
employees before finding that conduct to be unlawful under Section
8(a)(2). As Section 8(c) appears to warrant this revised construction
of the Wagner Act, as amended, the Board should take the initiative
on its own in demanding such proof and not wait for a reviewing
court to order it to do so.
The abandonment of the Board's historical application of 8(a)(2)
should not be mourned by those sympathetic to the goal of increasing
employees' say in decisions affecting their working lives, while
protecting employees' free choice regarding trade unionism. There is
little reason to believe that restricting the freedom of employers and
nonunion employee groups to discuss terms and conditions of
employment continues to assist trade union organizational efforts in
any significant way, assuming it ever did. The percentage of non-
agricultural workers in the American private sector who are members
of a trade union has been in almost continuous decline for the past 50
years. The net result of this decline is that only about 6.6% of non-
agricultural workers in the American private sector were members of
a trade union in 2012.' This is less than one-half the 16.3% rate
reckoned to have existed in the American private sector in 1934, the
year before the Wagner Act and its restrictions on company unionism
were enacted."' It is also less than one-half the 16% rate found to
have existed in the Canadian private sector in 2011,34 despite the fact
that Canada historically has imposed "few statutory impediments to
running non-union representation plans that expressly deal with
terms and conditions of employment."3  Indeed, it has been plausibly
332. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 43.
333. See L. TROY & N. SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP,
FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY app. A, at A-1 (1985).
334. See Sharanjit Uppal, Unionization 2011, 23 PERSP. ON LABOUR AND INCOME,
October 26, 2011, at 6, available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2011004/article/
11579-eng.htm (follow "PDF" hyperlink and then follow "Perspectives on Labour and
Income (vol. 23, no. 4) (PDF version, 170 kb)" hyperlink).
335. Daphne Taras, Reconciling Differences Differently: Employee Voice in Public
Policymaking and Workplace Governance, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 167, 188 n.37
(2007); see also Daphne Gottlieb Taras, Portrait of Nonunion Employee Representation in
Canada: History, Law and Contemporary Plans, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION, supra note 47, at 121, 136-137 (noting that neither Canada's Federal
statutes nor the provincial statutes for its nine predominantly English-speaking provinces
contained a provision prohibiting the existence of employer-dominated employee
organizations "or empowering the labor boards to order their dissolution").
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suggested that an increase in the number of nonunion employee
involvement programs that fall within the Wagner Act's broad
definition of a "labor organization" might actually stimulate workers'
interest in trade union organization "by making communication skills
and group interaction an integral part of their work lives.",3 1 In any
case, given that trade unions in the private sector have been adding so
few workers to their membership rolls in recent years through Board-
supervised representation elections,3 there is not much opportunity
for such programs to do much harm to trade unions.
Conversely, as it is now applied by the Board, Section 8(a)(2)
suppresses what the responses to the WRPS indicate is, for most
employees, the preferred means of dealing with their employer
regarding terms and conditions of employment. Given that
employers historically have reciprocated employees' interest in
cooperative mechanisms for labor-management dealings regarding
terms and conditions of employment, it seems safe to say that, as now
applied, Section 8(a)(2) on balance "discourages ... enhanced
employee voice and involvement.""
Restricting the application of Section 8(a)(2) to coercive
employer conduct would enhance the voice of employees at the
workplace not merely because it would permit employers to sponsor
employee involvement committees for the express purpose of
obtaining their employees' input regarding terms and conditions of
employment. It also would enhance the voice of employees by
removing the illiberal influence that the Board's current application
of Section 8(a)(2) has on employers' administration of employee
involvement committees that are primarily concerned with operations
and efficiency. From the point of view of a discussion of the efficient
operation of a production line, the distinction between terms and
conditions of employment and other subjects is an artificial one. Left
free to follow the paths where its members' muses take it, a
committee that is entrusted with the task of developing proposals to
336. Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition: the Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a) (2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV,
125, 154 (1994).
337. See Drew M. Simmons, National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Union
Representation Elections, 1997-2009, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, Table 1 (June 30, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cb20100628ar01pl.htm
(indicating that during the 13-year period from 1997-2009 there was an average of
approximately 76,257 eligible voters in elections won by unions each year).
338. Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation: A Legal/Policy
Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 47, at 196,208.
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improve operational efficiency will quite naturally veer into
discussions of "subjects such as safety, work schedules, pay incentives
and bonuses, and grievances."'3 Because under the current state of
the law a discussion of these issues may transform a committee into
an unlawfully dominated labor organization, an employer is obliged
to keep a tight rein over an employee committee's discussions
regarding operational efficiency to ensure that they don't venture into
forbidden areas. Such a practice is not conducive either to unleashing
employees' creativity or to spurring employees' interest in production
matters.
In any event, one can anticipate that, were Section 8(a)(2)'s
prohibitions confined to coercive employer conduct, the quantity of
employer-employee dialogue regarding terms and conditions of
employment would expand significantly. In view of the fact that the
current application of its prohibitions to noncoercive conduct is not
constitutionally permissible, the curtailment of this speech should no
longer be tolerated.
339. Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and
Participation Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 729, 744 (1999).
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